



The 19th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



LESSONS IDENTIFIED FROM THE WAR (CONFLICT) IN UKRAINE

MAKARIDZE Mamuka

Ministry of Defence, Georgia

Abstract:

This paper identifies key lessons from the international response to the conflict in Ukraine, emphasizing shifts in diplomacy, the strategic use of economic sanctions, and the significance of sustained military aid. Initially, global diplomatic attitudes were sceptical about severe measures. However, the resilience and determination of the Ukrainian people and their leadership catalysed a rapid change in international positions. Economic sanctions have demonstrated both immediate impacts and long-term potential to harm the Russian economy, underscoring the power of coordinated financial measures. Furthermore, the unprecedented military and humanitarian support for Ukraine illustrates the critical importance of sustained international commitment to counter aggression and highlights the need for a unified global response to uphold democratic values and international law.

Key words: International response; Diplomatic shifts; Economic sanctions; military aid; Ukrainian resilience; financial measures; International commitment; global response; Democratic value; International law; Counter aggression

1. Introduction

The conflict in Ukraine has emerged as a pivotal event in modern geopolitics, drawing significant international attention and response. This paper seeks to identify the key lessons derived from this conflict, particularly focusing on the evolution of international diplomatic stances, the implementation and efficacy of economic sanctions, and the critical role of sustained military aid. Initially, the global diplomatic community was hesitant to impose severe measures against Russia. However, the resilience and determination of the Ukrainian people, alongside the strategic leadership, prompted a rapid and decisive shift in international positions.

The use of hybrid warfare tactics by Russia, encompassing cyber warfare and information operations, challenged traditional military strategies and highlighted the evolving nature of modern conflicts. Economic sanctions, aimed at crippling the Russian economy, demonstrated both immediate impacts and potential long-term consequences. Meanwhile, unprecedented levels of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine underscored the necessity of a unified global response to counter aggression and uphold democratic values and international law.

By examining these aspects, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the international response to the Ukraine conflict and the strategic lessons that can be applied to future geopolitical crises.

2. International Response

The positions of the international community regarding Russia's waging of a full-scale war against Ukraine were in all respects radically different from the attitudes existing before the start of the war and in the first days of the war. This categorical change in positions was caused by many factors, but the first and foremost in this case is the dedication and self-sacrifice of the Ukrainian



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



people and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Of course, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his highly competent team work very effectively on shaping international opinion and decisions.

Let's follow in order. For example, before the start of the war and in the first days of the war, the attitude of diplomats, politicians and experts regarding “the disconnection of SWIFT from the Russian international settlement system”¹ was quite sceptical, and “the shutdown of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline”² was also considered unlikely. Regarding the latter, the basis for the formation of such an attitude was provided by the voiced position of the German government itself. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and individual members of his coalition cabinet were very cautious about blocking the Russian gas pipeline in the context of the outbreak of war. Their position regarding “arms sales to Ukraine”³ was even tougher. The German authorities were categorically opposed to the sale of arms to Ukraine by NATO member states, especially those made from German parts.

In private conversations, the introduction of sanctions against Putin was practically excluded. In all these cases, we saw what happened in just a few days, although before that, based on the intelligence services of NATO member states, information was spread that “Kiev would be in the hands of Russia in 96 hours.”⁴ The leaders of the international partners later openly confirmed that they were “offering the Ukrainian president, his family and members of his team to evacuate and leave the country in time.”⁵ If there were no doubts about the certainty of the fall of Kiev, it is also confirmed by the fact that practically all countries evacuated their embassies in Western Ukraine before the start of the war, and some within a few days after the start of the war. Some member states of NATO, together with diplomats, also withdrew from the country military instructors who had been in Ukraine for years and, especially, recently helped Ukrainians to acquire new defensive weapons. In the first hours of the war, their boisterous speeches, sarcasm and confidence were slowly replaced by confusion, and also by frustration caused by failure and the severity of sanctions.

To sum it up, everyone expected the world's largest and most "powerful" Second Army blitzkrieg across Ukraine and a quick end to the war by overthrowing the legitimate government and installing a puppet one in Kiev. All but the Ukrainian people, the armed forces and their leader. No matter how the processes develop and end, “93% of Ukrainian citizens are sure that they will end with their victory.”⁶

Also, Ukraine showed the world that:

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the start of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, the armed forces of Ukraine were created practically from scratch, despite the significant numerical superiority of the opponent, they did not allow the enemy to occupy the capital;

In the information campaign, Ukraine really defeated and shattered both the existing myths about the "invincibility" of the Russian armed forces and the all-powerful Russian propaganda machine;

The unity of state-minded political forces, in the conditions of the danger facing the country, played a very serious role in strengthening the nation's resilience and, ultimately, in the successful fight against Russian aggression;

All this convinced the world that this is not a war either for Donbas, or for Ukraine, or for stopping Ukraine from joining NATO, but it is a war against the civilized world, the liberal democratic order, the main values and values.

A combination of the above factors, together with a very successful aggressive/proactive diplomacy, played a decisive role in changing the positions of the international community. These changes affected both political positions and practical decisions regarding military and other types of aid. Obviously, the brutality of the crimes committed against the Ukrainian people and humanity by Vladimir Putin and his regime, especially the killing of civilians (children, women, the elderly), the destruction of non-military infrastructure (schools, kindergartens, maternity hospitals, hospitals, theatres and shopping facilities) leaves no moral choice.



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



Putin left no other option for the West, except for the introduction of unprecedented sanctions, the supply of modern weapons and the decision to isolate Russia practically 100%. It all started with the closure of the airspace for Russian civil aircraft, continued with the requisition of 90% of the aircraft fleet leased to Russia.

The exit of the largest oil and gas extraction companies, the export of their technologies, actually ensured the paralysis of the oil extraction process by Russia. The exit of transnational car manufacturers, in addition to actually putting Russian car owners in front of everyday problems, also caused significant damage to the Russian armament assembly process. In this regard, the introduction of sanctions against Russia by South Korea and Taiwan, which left Russian technology in space, in the air, at sea or on land without chips, was also of great importance.

The decisions of the President of the United States of America and his administration were very important, both regarding the unprecedented military aid and the most important financial and economic decisions taken against Russia. The USA, along with Great Britain and Canada, and later the European Union practically unanimously and simultaneously made a decision to practically completely disconnect the Russian banking system from the "SWIFT system,"⁷ a significant part of Russia's foreign exchange reserves, the leading Russian banks, the largest companies, Putin's immediate entourage and on „the freezing of assets and accounts of Russian oligarchs.”⁸ We are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars, as well as billions of dollars worth of property owned by both corporations and individuals. The decision to ban the purchase of Russian oil was also unprecedented. This “sanction”⁹ was subsequently joined by a significant part of the EU member states, although it was very difficult to reach unanimity on this issue.

From the very first hours of the beginning of the war, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his cabinet acted as the global democratic leader, directing efforts to stop Russian aggression, punish Putin's regime, and support Ukraine's freedom struggle. The supply of British-American anti-tank weapons played a decisive role in the destruction of hundreds of Russian tanks and armored vehicles and combat vehicles. He is also responsible for the collapse of "Londongrad", i.e., the largest center of Russian financial capital, which has been created in the capital of Great Britain for years. Poland's role in dealing with Russian aggression is very important. Polish leadership is at the head of all large-scale initiatives, military and financial support. Due to the activity of both the president and the prime minister, it was possible to supply almost all weapons and ammunition to Ukraine through the territory of Poland. Poland makes a big contribution to sheltering 1.5 million Ukrainians. Also, the role of Poland was important for Ukraine in starting the discussion on the issue of EU candidate status in an accelerated manner.

The Baltic countries also play an important role. They did their best to get ammunition and weapons to Ukraine on time; They did everything to cause maximum damage to Russia. One of the most important was their decision not to allow Russian ships into the ports of the Baltic states. Also, the parliaments of three countries activated the issue of "closing the sky" of Ukraine. I believe that it was the activity of Great Britain, Poland, and the Baltic states that led to the fact that in exchange for the introduction of a no-fly zone, as well as the delivery of combat aircraft at the first stage, the Alliance made a decision to supply air defense systems to Ukraine.

"Speech in the Bundestag"¹⁰ of the German Chancellor was very important to support of Ukraine. Since then, no one has mentioned "Northern Stream 2" and the issue of arms delivery/non-delivery for a long time. Moreover, based on various information, German veterans are fighting side by side with American, Canadian, British, Polish, Georgian and other European volunteers. As for the pipeline, there have been growing calls to „stop the Nord Stream 1 project.”¹¹ Both Germany and other EU member states and the EU itself as a whole have taken active measures and decisions to reduce dependence on Russian energy carriers. The European Commission decided that gas storage



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



facilities of various sizes, which are used to supply gas to the member states, should be built as soon as possible.

Although there is a widespread opinion that sanctions are not effective enough to stop the war, it is safe to say that in the medium and long term, the combination of these sanctions will have devastating consequences for Russia. At the first stage, Turkey's role in supporting Ukraine from the NATO member states should be especially noted. Although Turkey did not join the sanctions, it closed the Bosphorus Strait to Russian warships; Unmanned aerial vehicles of the "Bayraktar" company were continuously supplied to Ukraine, which at that time played a decisive role in repelling Russian military convoys. At the same time, the Turkish president, as a mediator, took a number of steps to stop Russia's aggression.

The actions of the Putin regime resulted in both Switzerland and Sweden providing effective aid to Ukraine after 200 years of neutrality. Switzerland has expressed readiness to disclose the identity of owners of Russian assets in Swiss banks. Also, Sweden and Finland supplied ammunition to Ukraine. At that time, the French president was conducting intensive negotiations with both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. In addition, France has frozen 22 billion euros of Russian state assets and 850 million euros of business and private individuals' finances and assets.

Japan's principled position is extremely important. He had his own problematic issues with Russia regarding the Kuril Islands and was always very careful about positioning himself with Russia, but the situation changed dramatically after Russia's large-scale attack on Ukraine. Japan joined international sanctions, including Russia's withdrawal from SWIFT, self-imposed sanctions that resulted in the freezing of an additional \$115 billion in Russian foreign exchange reserves; All major Japanese companies withdrew from the Russian market and closed their factories there. In response, Russia "withdrew from the post-World War II negotiations format" ¹² with Japan.

China's position is also significant, although China has supported Russia in opposing NATO's eastward expansion, it remains committed to respecting Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, expressing concern over crimes against civilians in Ukraine and, most importantly, refusing to supply arms to Russia. In addition, Chinese companies are well aware that falling under international sanctions can seriously harm them. Therefore, they refrain from dealing with Russia in a number of directions, and Chinese financial structures refuse to carry out transactions with Russian banks under sanctions. Above situation was in the first days, weeks, and months after the invasion, when it was critically important to get help for Ukraine to properly resist Russian aggression. After that, with a few exceptions, to this day, there has not been a European country that has not provided the greatest assistance to Ukraine.

At the beginning of 2024, the European Union unanimously approved the aid package of €50 billion as part of the Ukraine Facility.¹³ Also critically important for Ukraine is the "US\$61 billion military aid package approved by Congress."¹⁴ Although aid to Ukraine continued over those two years, the quantity and timing of supplies were often delayed and insufficient to meet Kyiv's needs, particularly for major combat equipment such as tanks, long-range weapons, and the still-undelivered F-16s.

And yet, overall, Ukraine has an unprecedented support effort worth around 100 billion Euro from 31 donor countries and 5.6 billion Euro allocated by EU institutions, from February 2022 to January 2024.¹⁵ Ukraine also was provided humanitarian aid and financial support for the connection of Ukraine's energy infrastructure with the European Union's electrical network, the tax-free import of Ukrainian goods to the Union, etc.¹⁶

Without such military and economic support, Ukraine would not have been able to protect more than 80 percent of its territory against a Russian invasion. However, this aid comes with restrictions on the use of arms. In particular, Washington and its major allies placed limitations on



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



significant Ukrainian operations in Russian territory,¹⁷ despite their potential operational value in weakening Russia's war effort. Additionally, they avoided or postponed certain supplies to prevent an escalation between Moscow and NATO. On the other hand, the Kremlin received military aid from North Korea and Iran¹⁸ without significant constraints on its strategy against Ukraine. Meanwhile, China's role has so far been limited to a political, energy, and economic partnership with Russia, falling short of providing defence equipment.

Disengagement by the US and/or Europe from this war would deliver a tremendous blow to Kyiv's military capacity to defend its people and territory and likely lead to a Russian strategic victory in the mid-to-long term. Conversely, a stable, robust, long-term commitment to supplying Ukraine's armed forces is essential for any consideration of the best Ukrainian strategy, given the two years of invasion and the ongoing stalemate on the ground.

3. Hybrid Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War

Hybrid threats and methods are not inherently new. Covert operations, psychological and information operations, sabotage and support of proxy groups have been a permanent part of the history of human wars. The use of cyber means and modern high technologies is also a natural stage in the evolution of war. The wars of any generation were greatly influenced by the innovations accompanying the development of humanity. In this regard, nothing new is happening today.

The current Russia-Ukraine war is in the center of world attention, both due to the importance of the potential consequences of the conflict, as well as from a general information point of view. However, it is very important to touch on one topic that deserves attention and the necessity of its military theoretical and practical understanding is on the agenda, this is the impact of the hybrid warfare factor on this conflict. The importance of hybrid warfare, exaggerated ideas about it, prevailing media emphasis over the years became an important factor, due to which the Russian military thought was too concentrated on using the methods that had already become "traditional" for it as a general plan. "Hybrid warfare essentially refers to the use of unconventional methods of warfare clubbed with the traditional means of military actions. It includes means like economic coercion, disinformation and propaganda, use of proxies, cyber warfare, etc."¹⁹

Against the background of the events known to everyone before the start of the war, the concentration and gathering of Russian troops around Ukraine raised certain questions - how much was possible even by a group of 200,000, under the conditions of approximately the same number of armed forces of Ukraine, partial or total occupation of the country. Accordingly, the realization of the military-political goals set for Moscow by conventional methods seemed to be an incredible adventure. Considering these factors, for the majority of observers, the decision to start the war turned out to be absolutely unexpected, since, according to purely military logic, under the conditions of such a balance of forces, the attacking side was actually doomed to failure.

However, it seems that in the last 10 years, the Russian military-political leadership, fascinated by the results of the Russian hybrid war, was imbued with completely different expectations. For any war plan, its military theoretical component is an important component it is on this that the highest military-political leadership should take the idea, if you want a war plan for the future conflict. For the military-theoretical understanding of the Russia-Ukraine war, it is necessary to think about the alleged harmful effects of the so-called the success of the "Russian hybrid war" affected the Kremlin itself and the Russian military-political leadership. In order to clearly understand what we are dealing with, let us once again explain the essence of war, its connection with politics and hybrid war.



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



According to the famous Prussian military theorist Clausewitz, “war has three actors, all three are equally important when discussing war, and neglecting any of them leads any theory to a dead end. Thus, the triad government-army-people is the axis on which the theory of war is based.”²⁰ Of these, the government politically conducts the war, the people are the substrate of internal hatred, and the army, on behalf of these people, fights for the realization of political goals. “War aims to realize one's will through violent confrontation. The strategy involves putting the opponent in such a difficult situation that they prefer to concede, increasing their motivation to surrender and If morality is ignored, any method to achieve this becomes acceptable.”²¹

Following the annexation of Crimea and the well-known events in Ukraine in 2014, many foreign researchers attempted to find the origins of Russia's "new" strategy or tactics during these events, which led them to the article "The Importance of Science in the Future for foreseeing" published in February 2013 by Russia's Chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov.²² Although the phrase "hybrid warfare" is not used in the paper, Gerasimov was later viewed as an ideologue of Russian hybrid warfare based on the opinions presented in it.

In the article, the author emphasizes “the importance of non-military means, the role of informational and psychological operations in modern conflicts. Focuses on the declining importance of traditional military means in achieving the political objectives of war.”²³ Emphasizes the role of non-military methods for the realization of strategic tasks, which are “aimed at shaking the foundations of the state, so that it is not necessary to use military means to defeat the opponent. According to Gerasimov, the front line in such wars is very conditional and can be passed in all spaces at the same time.”²⁴ Gerasimov's vision is based on the idea that the mind is the main target of modern warfare, and therefore information and psychological warfare dominate modern military operations.

We can boldly say that the essence of the Clausewitzian war with Gerasimov, of course, does not change, the goal is to break the opponent's will, but with other non-traditional methods. It seems that before the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, the strategic plan of the Russian military machine was based on these visions.

On February 24, 2022, the initial Russian plan for the war in Ukraine was based on false expectations and the success of the results of the Russian hybrid war operations carried out so far. In particular, Moscow's indirect tactics against Ukraine should have created a favourable environment for Moscow to intervene and potentially occupy the majority of Ukraine through local administrations and pro-Russian volunteers.

As a result of the events of 2014-15 in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, events in Syria, political manipulations in various Western countries, interference in elections, political murders, support for various radical groups, and, in general, the confusion of a unified political discourse in the West, "emboldened" Moscow and, in particular, Vladimir Putin. , it seems that a solid syndrome of impunity appeared, that his attempt to finally solve the "Ukraine problem" would remain absolutely unpunished. In other words, the so-called Russian hybrid warfare would continue to be the main formula for victory.

The decision to start the war was made on the basis that the Clausewitzian trinity we mentioned - Government, People, Army Union, in the case of Ukraine, as a result of years of Russian hybrid warfare (in our opinion, hybrid methods) efforts, was so weak and unstable that Moscow's immediate attack on Kiev and after the capture of the government quarters, organized resistance had to be crushed. Therefore, the balance of military forces unfavourable to Moscow before the start of the war should not have become an important factor. As it seems, such an idea prevailed first of all in the idea of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the entire Russian military-political elite was directed to strengthen this image. Even the "episodes" of the Security



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



Council session shown on TV before the start of the war lead us to draw such a conclusion. It seems that the practice of turning what is desired into reality in the Kremlin has been accepted so much that the entire Russian military-political elite, or the largest part of it with the boldness of Vladimir Putin, looked in this crooked mirror of reality, where Putin, supported by Russia's impunity from the West and recent "successes", could not fulfill his geopolitical ambitions. For the realization of the main final chord, it remained only to take a decisive step to finally establish Ukraine in the Russian space.

The history of human wars knows more than one example when military-strategic calculations subordinated to wrong political goals or expectations became the reason for the failure of states in the war and, in general, their presence became a matter of non-existence. No matter how modern equipped, armed, and motivated an army may be in pursuit of the military objectives set by its political leadership, if these objectives are based on miscalculations and expectations, and completely subjugate the war strategy to these misrepresentations, then such military campaigns are most likely It is doomed to collapse, and the actions of the Russian armed forces in the first phase of the war in Ukraine will become such an example for the military history of mankind.

In Moscow, the military-political expectations determined by the hybrid war approaches were subordinated to the start of a war against the largest state in Europe, in relation to which the Russian army did not have adequate resources, primarily human, to fulfill the tasks actually set, therefore, all bets were placed on the quick defeat of Kiev, with the expectation that Ukraine The people and the political authorities would not have put up enough resistance if everything was ready for the 5th column to be launched and the Russian army would have had to enter Kiev with a triumphant march amid only minor opposition. In other words, the union of Clausewitz's “trinity - government, army, people”²⁵ would be so weak in the case of Ukraine that Moscow would be able to break Ukraine's will to resist without much effort.

Today, we all clearly see that the war in Ukraine is another classic example, where the unity of Clausewitz's trinity works successfully - the government completely provides the military-political and diplomatic dimension of the war, thus the backed army fights firmly and with a high fighting spirit, and the people have the necessary and most important moral character for this process. It is a source of spiritual strength and an economic backbone. As a result, the connection between the components of the trinity is strong and in the conditions of foreign aid ensures the successful actions of Ukrainian troops against the occupiers.

The Russian military machine, caught in the wrong military-political calculations of its own political leadership and forced to change the plan of combat operations as a result of the initial defeat, is in a much more disadvantageous situation and is trying to perform limited tasks, which according to its calculations should become the basis of profitable political trade at the negotiating table. Despite such efforts, Russia has lost the war, from a strategic point of view, as a result of wrong military-theoretical and political calculations before its start, primarily due to its successful use of hybrid instruments in recent years.

In recent years, the fascination with the question of hybrid warfare has become a special phenomenon, and it has often been presented as a completely new or difficult to explain phenomenon in military theory. Moreover, it was often presented as the main strategic method of wars conducted by states, which caused skepticism, because the talk that conventional wars have eaten up time, great powers will no longer use traditional means and methods of war, was naturally false, and the Russia-Ukraine war This was well demonstrated once again. Moreover, Russia's military failure was caused by a failure to implement the principles of traditional, fundamental warfare - a complete failure of intelligence, logistics, command and control. In such conditions, no hybrid warfare method can help the armed forces. The Russian-Ukrainian war is a very good example of the fact that unsubstantiated obsession with certain theories and concepts, as has



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



happened many times before, can become a matter of presence or absence for the state and its leadership, therefore the military-political elite of any country should understand the fundamental principles of war, era and the potential impact of specific circumstances on the course of the planned war and only then take the appropriate steps.

The use of non-military means as military weapons is a hallmark of 21st century Russian warfare. Russia's goal is to create a permanent front that will break the boundaries between peace and war, create chaos and disorder, shake the state foundations of "disloyal neighbors". After the February 24, 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine search for hybrid elements in Russia's actions began, comparing the developments with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. From the beginning of the war until today, we see that, Russia cannot achieve its goal, as it managed in Crimea. The question arises: what distinguishes today's Russia from the Russia of 2014? And what distinguishes today's Ukraine from Ukraine in 2014?

Putin, traditionally, used to his advantage the dependence of European countries on Russian natural resources and as I mentioned above, Putin was emboldened, which led to the start of hostilities on his part, mainly during the winter period (Crimea - February 20, Ukraine - February 24). Moscow creates a syndrome of fear and thus tries to indirectly influence the will of political actors. Russia's actions in Crimea began with the manipulation of public opinion. The "willingness of the people"²⁶ in Crimea to join the Russian Federation became a pretext for carrying out hostilities. In 2014, along with the military conflict, the world saw numerous cases of cyber-attacks, disinformation and propaganda. The cyber-attacks carried out by Russia on Ukraine caused a communication collapse, primarily aimed at disconnecting members of parliament from the contact space. In addition, the Ukrainian government's website became the target of the hacking attack; "It was not functioning even 72 hours after the annexation of Crimea."²⁷ In order to demoralize the population, telephone messages were sent to the family members of the soldiers, giving "false information"²⁸ about their deaths. With all this, it took Russia only one month to achieve its goal. All attempts by Ukraine to counter the attacks have been unsuccessful.

Russia did not betray its usual tactics in 2022 either. He began using active measures, including espionage, cyber-attacks and disinformation, before military attacks. Putin aimed to dismantle the national security system of Ukraine, prevent the proper functioning of state institutions; In addition, access to reliable information and vital services was restricted for Ukrainians. All this would lead to the loss of trust in the state, facilitate the conduct of military operations and, ultimately, the conquest of Ukraine. The ratio of use of non-military means to military means was much higher. By fighting against Ukrainian "disinformation", Russia justified the attack on the TV tower in Kyiv. Before the siege of Mariupol, telephone messages were sent to the population with the content "your government has abandoned you."²⁹ Several times there was blackmail with the use of nuclear weapons and radioactive substances.

As we can see, Russia's action tactics have not changed significantly from 2014 to 2022, but the results of the action have changed: cyber-attacks - more or less, espionage and disinformation have turned out to be largely ineffective, and if we compared to 2014, Russia began to use military force on a larger scale, but in comparison to 2014, Ukraine has significantly changed its tactics for combating Russia's hybrid attacks in 2022. Ukraine confronted Russia in all dimensions of the war. against Russian propaganda, they use a variety of social media methods. The daily communication of the government, especially President Volodymyr Zelensky, with the Ukrainian people raised public morale. The coverage of the events and the distribution of photo-video material exposed the Russian brutality.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky explained every day in his daily speeches that Russia's victory would be the defeat not only of Ukraine but of the entire Western world. The



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



activation of this rhetoric gained Ukraine international trust and support. Ukraine clearly showed the world that the line between Russia and the West passed through it. In the event of the defeat of Ukraine, Russia would continue its military expansion, and its main target would be post-socialist countries, primarily Poland or the Baltic states. "Finland and Sweden (18 May 2022) simultaneously handed in their official letters of application to join NATO"³⁰ and became members in a short period of time after the war began to protect against potential threats, proving the validity of these opinions. The West has provided extensive support to Ukraine through the transfer of IT equipment, software and training. Along with private sector assistance, real-time cyber intervention by European and US cyber agencies was critical. Because of the initial expectation of a short war, Moscow's cyberattack against Ukraine turned out to be ill-prepared.

On the question, what differentiates today's Russia from the Russia of 2014? And what differentiates today's Ukraine from Ukraine in 2014? The answer is as follows: today's Russia is not significantly different from the Russia of 2014, which cannot be said about Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea became a bitter lesson in how to fight a Russian hybrid war. In 2022, Ukraine began to respond to all types of attacks and use non-military means as weapons of war. With his own efforts and the support of the West, he proved to us that it is possible to effectively fight Russia's hybrid war.

Additionally, key implications arise for the defense and security studies community. First, territorial wars have different end states compared to irregular wars, counterinsurgencies, and civil wars. Thus, militaries must be tailored to the specific conflict. For example, a counterinsurgency force cannot win a territorial war against an industrialized army designed for attrition. Policymakers and military leaders must understand this when planning future forces.

Second, territorial wars require strategies that align with their specific objectives. A strategy focused on precision strikes without adequate land forces will fail in a territorial war, especially against an industrialized army designed for attrition. Policymakers and military leaders must regularly reassess and adjust their political goals and strategies to ensure resources are used effectively and realistically.

Third, physical mass—meaning more manpower—is crucial in territorial wars, often more so than precision strikes and long-range fires. An army with greater manpower can better hold and defend territory, making it more resilient to attacks and harder to defeat, both in terms of resources expended and lives lost.

Fourth, overcoming a well-prepared, layered defense, like Russia's in Ukraine, is extremely difficult. The challenge increases if the attacking force lacks resilient land forces capable of³¹ defeating the occupying army,³² moving into liberated territory, and³³ controlling that land. Armies that can strike but lack the depth to advance and hold territory are ineffective beyond defense. This contradicts the conventional belief that future forces should be small, light, and dispersed.

Fifth, Carl von Clausewitz's warning that "So long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control, he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him." it means an unresolved conflict keeps both sides vulnerable is evident in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Neither side can decisively defeat the other, resulting in a prolonged stalemate. This highlights the necessity for a military force that can not only defeat the opponent but also secure and hold territory. Without such a force, tactical gains are temporary, and the war remains protracted. Decisive victories can potentially turn a long war of attrition into a shorter one.

Based on the declared interests of Russia, its strategic goals can be formulated as follows:

- fracture the Ukrainian state—politically, territorially and culturally;
- maintain sufficient territorial acquisitions to support a range of acceptable political-military outcomes;



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



- maintain strategic materiel overmatch;
- exhaust Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting—both materially and as regards Ukrainian support from the international community;
- normalize the conflict’s abnormalities; and
- undercut and erode Ukraine’s ability to conduct offensive operations to reclaim annexed territory.

Collectively, these objectives indicate that Russia aims to denationalize Ukraine. Raphael Lemkin defines "denationalization" as systematically eroding or destroying another state's national character and identity, including its culture, language, and customs."³⁴ Since February 2022, Russia’s policy and military goals have slightly evolved, but the denationalization of Ukraine remains central to the Kremlin’s strategy. In 2022, Russia sought to remove President Zelenskyy, end Ukrainian self-rule, install a pro-Russian leadership, and annex significant Ukrainian territory. Putin spoke of "DE nazifying" and "Demilitarizing" Ukraine, aiming to keep it politically and militarily neutral."³⁵ He reaffirmed these goals in a “December 2023 press conference.”³⁶ However, Russia's military efforts have stalled since failing to capture Kyiv in April 2022. Nonetheless, the possibility of renewed efforts to oust Zelenskyy in 2024 remains, especially if U.S. support to Ukraine remains halted.

The Kremlin appears to be prolonging the conflict to outlast Ukraine’s financial and military support from the international community and deplete Ukraine’s resources for offensive operations. By doing so, Russia likely aims to push Ukraine toward strategic exhaustion, eventually forcing Kyiv to negotiate a peace deal. It seems that, “Russia's territorial ambitions in Ukraine span a range of acceptable outcomes.”³⁷ At a minimum, Russia aims to retain control of the Donbas, the land bridge to Crimea, and Crimea itself. This land bridge includes the Zaporizhian and Kherson oblasts, providing a continuous ground link between the Donbas and Crimea. This connection is crucial for Russia as it simplifies the governance, defense, and retention of Crimea.

The presence of Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian weapons on the Ukrainian battlefield indicates that "Russia is struggling to sustain the conflict's attritional nature."³⁸ Although it is difficult to gauge the extent of external support through open sources, it is clear that this aid helps Russia overcome some of its defense industry's production and distribution shortfalls. Consequently, support from these countries enables the Kremlin to prolong the conflict, aiming to exhaust Ukraine’s military and deplete Kyiv's capacity to sustain its resistance.

Russia has endured the initial risks of invading Ukraine. Although early economic sanctions hit hard, Russian industry and the economy adapted, with help from “China, North Korea, and Iran, to offset many challenges.”³⁹ Additionally, the gradual Western support has given Russian forces time to observe, learn, and adapt to those weapon systems, developing effective countermeasures to “Western technology and firepower.”⁴⁰ Such an approach questions the „U.S. and other Western states’ strategy of third-party support to Ukraine.”⁴¹ The primary risks the Russo-Ukrainian War poses to Russia today are: 1) U.S. and/or NATO intervention with land forces on behalf of Ukraine. 2) Political upheaval due to domestic unrest.

The risk of U.S. and/or NATO intervention with land forces is low, likely remaining so due to "fears of Russian escalation with nuclear weapons."⁴² Although the likelihood of Russian nuclear strikes in Ukraine is also low, Russian leaders frequently use "nuclear threats to deter unwanted actions."⁴³ For example, Russia's Deputy Security Council Chairman recently threatened nuclear retaliation if Ukraine used "Western-supplied long-range missiles to attack Russian missile sites."⁴⁴ This follows Russia’s "repositioning of some nuclear arsenal to Belarus in summer 2023."⁴⁵ However, without U.S. or NATO land forces' involvement or the potential loss of Crimea, the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons remains low.



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



To mitigate the risk of domestic unrest and political instability, Putin and his supporters employ traditional Russian methods. These include "arrests, assassinations, disappearances, and suppression to deter opposition to policies on Ukraine."⁴⁶ The assassination of "Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, in August 2023 is a high-profile example."⁴⁷ Similarly, the "periodic disappearances, imprisonments and death in prison of Alexei Navalny"⁴⁸ demonstrate the regime's efforts to silence political opposition. Additionally, "Igor Girkin, a critic of Putin's handling of the war, was sentenced to four years in prison in January 2024."⁴⁹ Suppression of "journalists has also intensified, aiming to silence dissent amid the economic and domestic upheavals caused by the war."⁵⁰

Former U.S. Army Europe commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, states that Russia "mobilizes citizens from peripheral and rural areas for the war in Ukraine."⁵¹ Many of these individuals are "ethnic minorities, considered of lesser importance in Putin's social hierarchy."⁵² By drawing heavily from regions outside major population centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg, Putin mitigates potential domestic unrest, as "combat losses are borne by those with lower social status."⁵³ This strategy allows Putin to prolong the conflict and attempt to weaken Ukrainian and Western resolve.

If winning in war is defined by achieving political-military objectives at the expense of the adversary's goals, Russia has made little tangible progress in two years. Its strategy of exhaustion and territorial annexation is progressing but at high costs to the Russian economy and people. Despite this, Russia's strong defensive fortifications indicate it will likely retain the upper hand on the battlefield.

Ukraine aims to liberate its territory, including the "Donbas and Crimea, and restore its 1991 borders."⁵⁴ Additionally, Ukraine seeks to strengthen ties with the West, pursuing security partnerships and EU membership. Zelenskyy's government continues to seek "political, military, and economic support from the international community."⁵⁵ Kyiv's efforts to join the EU and maintain international support are arguably more achievable than removing Russian forces from its territory. From a tactical perspective, Ukraine faces the daunting task of reclaiming "nearly 20 percent of its land, even to retake a small portion."⁵⁶ Compounding the problem is the size of Russia's occupation force. Putin has indicated that "Russia has 670,000 soldiers committed to the conflict, a significant increase from the initial 190,000."⁵⁷ While these numbers are hard to verify, assuming all 670,000 are in Ukraine, the traditional 3:1 attacker-to-defender ratio suggests Ukraine would need over two million troops for a successful attack. Are two million troops really necessary to evict Russian forces and hold against a counterattack? Some analysts, old and current, argue that "the 3:1 ratio is flawed and irrelevant."⁵⁸ Alternatively, modern technology might reduce the need for such a large number of land forces.

Despite advancements in technology, such as long-range precision strikes, drones, and targeting information, these tools support but do not replace the essential role of land forces in advancing or defending positions. Technology must be considered in the context of both supporting operations and countering adversarial actions. If Russia's strategy focuses on retaining territory and conducting defensive operations, and Ukraine lacks sufficient forces for a successful attack-defeat-occupy-defend sequence, then reliance on technology alone may be inadequate. This imbalance between Kyiv's goals and its resources contributes to the conflict's characterization as a war of attrition.

The greatest risk to Ukraine's strategy for winning the war against Russia is the potential loss of political, financial, and military support from the U.S. and other European partners. One of Kyiv's biggest strategic risks is depleting its military forces to the point where Russian forces could exploit vulnerable positions and seize more territory. For example, Ukraine's counteroffensive in the



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



summer of 2023 might have created weak spots in its lines, potentially allowing a localized Russian counterattack to achieve an operational breakthrough. While this didn't occur, it's a critical consideration for military planners if Zelenskyy aims to liberate all Ukrainian territory from Russian control. Reclaiming Crimea could be a game-changer. Putin has declared "Crimea as Russia's red line,"⁵⁹ implying a nuclear response to any serious Ukrainian attempt to retake the peninsula. Policymakers and strategists in Kyiv must consider this before making any moves to seize and hold Crimea. While some might see Putin's red line as a bluff, the threat is credible given his deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus and repositioning of nuclear strike weapons near Ukraine earlier in the conflict.

As noted in the section on Ukraine's strategic ends, "manpower is the biggest resource inhibiting Ukraine from attaining its political-military objectives."⁶⁰ Even if Kyiv initiates conscription, it would need to train an army of over two million troops to remove Russian forces, based on the 3:1 attacker-to-defender ratio. Technology, such as precision strike weapons, drones, and advanced intelligence, might shift this ratio to 2:1 or even 1.5:1 in open combat. However, this advantage diminishes in urban areas due to International Humanitarian Law and the complexities of targeting, highlighting the challenges of urban warfare.

The math gets even more challenging when this context is applied. Trevor Dupuy writes that, "The 3:1 force ratio requirement for the attacker cannot be of useful value without some knowledge of the behavioral and other combat variable factors involved."⁶¹ Factors like the operating environment, the type of opponent, and their historical combat methods must be considered. Both theory and military doctrine suggest that "the attacker-to-defender ratio in urban environments increases from 3:1 to 6:1."⁶²

Given the many cities in Ukraine's occupied areas and the extensive front lines, this presents a significant challenge. Hypothetically, Russian forces could strong-point cities like Donetsk, Mariupol, Melitopol, Simferopol, and Sevastopol, creating a network of interlocked defense points. This would require Ukraine to apply a ratio of 3:1 to 6:1 in combat power, increasing the overall force needed to remove Russian troops. If Ukraine removes Russian forces, it must also consider the potential for insurgency. Retaking territory is one challenge; securing loyalty is another. Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea have been under Russian control for a decade, making their political loyalties uncertain. Therefore, the possibility of insurgency in these regions must be factored into the human capital needed for reclaiming and holding them.

The shortage of essential ammunition, such as artillery, rockets, and anti-aircraft missiles, is a major issue for Ukraine's battlefield success. Although Congress approved funding in March 2024, the delay caused a significant gap in support, worsening the ammunition crisis and potentially creating a more critical situation. Currently, Ukrainian units are nearing the point where they can only defend and hold the front lines. Without sufficient ammunition, they will be unable to conduct robust offensive operations necessary to penetrate Russian defenses and defeat Russian forces. Also, a delay is developing between the time when the military can deliver equipment funded by Congress and when Ukrainian forces can use it. During this interim, Russian offensive operations have increased, while Ukraine's ability to defend effectively has decreased. Consequently, Russian forces right now trying to penetrate Ukrainian lines to exploit the ammunition crisis and gain additional territory to strengthen their future bargaining position.

Ukraine's strategic ends are significantly constrained by its limited manpower and ammunition. These limitations hinder Ukraine's ability to offensively retake the Donbas, the land bridge to Crimea, and Crimea itself. Michael Kofman and Franz-Stefan Gady assumption that, for the foreseeable future, "Ukrainian forces are limited to defensive operations along the contact line and to small, limited objective offensives with operations."⁶³ Although Gady's assessment was more



The 19th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



optimistic than Kofman's, both analysts suggest a very challenging 2024 for Kyiv's armed forces. They agree that Ukraine will likely be limited to defending the contact line, with sufficient force to prevent Russian breakthroughs.

The key finding is that Ukraine lacks the capability for offensive operations on the scale needed to retake significant territories from Russia. While precision strikes and air power can assist, Ukrainian ground forces must still physically clear, hold, and defend the terrain against Russian counterattacks. Therefore, any large-scale Ukrainian offensive is unlikely through 2024. Ukraine may attempt smaller-scale offensives, but larger operations exceed its current capabilities. U.S. weapons, ammunition, and military equipment are crucial for Ukraine. However, delays in supply delivery are weakening Ukraine's armed forces and hindering the development of effective military strategy. As a result, 2024 appears challenging for Ukraine to achieve its political-military objectives. Moreover, Ukraine's manpower limitations will continue to prevent large-scale offensives in 2024. While support from the United States and other Western nations can alleviate some of these challenges, they won't entirely eliminate them. As a result, the conflict is likely to remain characterized by attritional warfare between opposing trench networks throughout 2024.

The current state of the Russo-Ukrainian War is a stalemate, driven by conflicting strategies. While Russia aims to retain annexed territory, Ukraine lacks the means to forcibly remove Russian forces. Ukraine's ability to liberate and hold occupied areas is questionable due to manpower and resource constraints. Thus, precision strike strategies and light-footprint approaches are inadequate against industrialized armies geared towards physical destruction and territorial control. The future of warfare lies in robust land forces capable of overwhelming firepower and seizing territory from aggressor armies, marking a departure from past 20th-century conflicts.

Russia's actions in Ukraine highlight the supremacy of mass over precision. While precision tactics may secure tactical victories in isolated instances, they often fall short in achieving strategic success. Dismissing Russia's mass strategy as "stupid" overlooks its effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives. In conflicts centered on territorial annexation, mass plays a crucial role in solidifying gains and defending against counterattacks, demonstrating its significance in warfare.

As a small conclusion, I would like to mention that, The Russo-Ukrainian War highlights the importance of defeating enemy armies to secure long-term stability. Ukraine's failure to neutralize Russia's forces means ongoing challenges from Kremlin ambitions. Without the capability to decisively defeat and hold territory, the conflict may endure until Ukraine can expel Russian forces, reaches strategic exhaustion, or both sides seek resolution. In the interim, Kyiv will focus on fortifying its position while building its military capacity for future success.

4. Conclusions

The conflict in Ukraine has imparted several crucial lessons for the international community. Firstly, it has shown the importance of adaptability in diplomatic strategies. A united and strong international stance against Russian aggression resulted from the visible resilience and effective communication displayed by the Ukrainian leadership, which swiftly dispelled the initial skepticism of world leaders.

Economic sanctions have proven to be a powerful tool, inflicting significant damage on the Russian economy and demonstrating the effectiveness of coordinated financial measures. However, these sanctions also highlighted the necessity for long-term planning and the potential repercussions on global markets.

The extensive military and humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine has been vital in sustaining its defense capabilities. This support emphasizes the importance of a sustained international



**The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024**



commitment to counter aggression and protect sovereign nations. The conflict has reaffirmed the critical need for a unified global response to uphold democratic values and international law.

In conclusion, the Ukraine conflict has underscored the evolving nature of warfare and the necessity for adaptive, coordinated international strategies. The lessons learned from this conflict will be instrumental in shaping future responses to global crises, ensuring that the international community remains vigilant and prepared to uphold the principles of sovereignty and democracy.

References:

- [1] Demetri Sevastopol, George Parker, Stephen Morris, Sam Fleming. *World leaders divided on whether to eject Russia from Swift payments system*, FINANCIAL TIMES, 25 February 2022, <https://www.ft.com/content/69f72de5-d727-496d-9f9d-316db7bdaf03>
- [2] *Why Germany's Scholz is hesitant when it comes to confronting Russia on Nord Stream 2 pipeline project*, The Week, Updated on 09 February 2022, <https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2022/02/09/why-germanys-scholz-is-hesitant-when-it-comes-to-confronting-russia-on-nord-stream-2-pipeline-project.html>
- [3] William Noah Glucroft, *Why Germany refuses weapons deliveries to Ukraine*, DW, 19 January 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/why-germany-refuses-weapons-deliveries-to-ukraine/a-60483231>
- [4] Naveed Jamali, David Brennan, Tom O'Connor. *U.S. Expects Kyiv to Fall in Days as Ukraine Source Warns of Encirclement*, Newsweek, Updated on 25 February 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/us-expects-kyiv-fall-days-ukraine-source-warns-encirclement-1682326>
- [5] Maroosha Muzaffar, *Boris Johnson says he had offered Zelensky and his family refuge in the UK*, INDEPENDENT, 21 March 2022, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/boris-johnson-zelensky-family-refuge-b2040242.html>
- [6] *93% of Ukrainians believe in victory over Russia*, The Kyiv Independent, 20 March 2022, <https://kyivindependent.com/poll-93-of-ukrainians-believe-in-victory-over-russia/>
- [7] Katie Prescott, *West to cut some Russian banks off from Swift*, BBC, 27 February 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60542433>
- [8] Huileng Tan, *Russia's finance minister has admitted the country can't use nearly half its \$640 billion foreign currency war chest because of Western sanctions*, BUSINESS INSIDER, 14 Mar 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-admits-it-cant-access-nearly-half-foreign-currency-reserves-2022-3>
- [9] Josh Wingrove, Justin Sink, Jordan Fabian, Jennifer Jacobs. *U.S. and U.K. ban Russian oil imports in huge escalation of sanctions*, FINANCIAL POST, 08 Mar 2022, <https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/oil-gas/joe-biden-bans-russian-fossil-fuels-in-huge-escalation-of-sanctions>
- [10] Sabine Kinkartz, *Germany changes tack in 'response to Putin's aggression'*, DW, 27 Feb 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/german-chancellor-olaf-scholz-announces-paradigm-change-in-response-to-ukraine-invasion/a-60932652>
- [11] Philipp Löhler, *Shut down of Nord Stream 1 Gas Pipeline due to Russian war on Ukraine*, openPetition, 03 Mar 2022, <https://www.openpetition.eu/petition/online/shut-down-of-nord-stream-1-gas-pipeline-due-to-russian-war-on-ukraine>
- [12] *Japan opposes Russian withdrawal from World War II peace treaty talks over sanctions*, CNN, 21 March 2022, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/21/asia/russia-halts-japan-war-peace-talks-intl-hnk/index.html?fbclid=IwAR2Ypf-VsnCNEJpzuahitQ5r6KzkGq4C32MBmUICSiMmK9s1B6f02yF7Uo8>
- [13] Jorge Liboreiro, *EU leaders approve €50 billion deal for Ukraine after Viktor Orbán lifts his veto*, Euronews, 01 Feb 2024, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/02/01/eu-leaders->



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



- [approve-50-billion-deal-for-ukraine-after-orban-lifts-veto?fbclid=IwAR2IErzdQODCOOgLPqqSkbkCc4wtHPCRAQYCdY25tOD6tG3jGFmPEkFcRJQ](#)
[14] US speaker of the House Mike Johnson, *House approves \$61bn aid for Ukraine – what we know so far, and what happens next*, *The Guardian*, 21 Apr 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/21/house-approves-61bn-aid-for-ukraine-what-we-know-so-far-and-what-happens-next>
- [15] For a good accounting of such effort see Kiel Institute for the World Economy, *Ukraine Support Tracker*, updated on 16 February 2024, <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker>.
- [16] European Commission, *EU Solidarity with Ukraine*, https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/index_en (accessed 20 February 2024).
- [17] Kanishka Singh, “US Says It Does Not Support Ukrainian Strikes inside Russia”, in *Reuters*, 23 August 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-it-does-not-support-ukrainian-strikes-inside-russia-2023-08-23>.
- [18] Karen DeYoung, “North Korea Provided Russia with Weapons, White House Says”, in *The Washington Post*, 13 October 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/13/north-korea-...> “Iran Agrees to Ship Missiles, More Drones to Russia”, in *Reuters*, 19 October 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-iran-agrees-ship-missiles-more-drones-russia-defying-west-sources-2022-10-18>.
- [19] *Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy: From Crimea to Ukraine*, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION “ORF”, 01 Mar 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russias-hybrid-warfare-strategy?fbclid=IwAR0431RoIW9G3PrfhJ118J6a00h22h5ZpxPJGx3vAViwrzVMtQYoodwgsL4>
- [20] CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, Translated MICHAEL HOWARD, PETER PARET, *ON WAR*, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 1984, <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/EWS%20On%20War%20Reading%20Book%201%20Ch%201%20Ch%202.pdf>
- [21] Giorgi Antadze, *Captive of Hybrid War: About Several Aspects of the Russia-Ukraine War*, Geocase, 20 June 2022, <https://www.geocase.ge/ka/publications/763/hibriduli-omis-tyveobashiruset-ukrainis-omis-ramdenime-aspeqtis-shesakheb>, GEO.
- [22] Mark Galeotti, “*The Gerasimov Doctrine*”, Berlin Policy Journal, 28 APRIL 2020, <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-gerasimov-doctrine/>
- [23] Mark Galeotti, “*The Gerasimov Doctrine*”, Berlin Policy Journal, 28 APRIL 2020, <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-gerasimov-doctrine/>
- [24] Mark Galeotti, “*The Gerasimov Doctrine*”, Berlin Policy Journal, 28 APRIL 2020, <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/the-gerasimov-doctrine/>
- [25] CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, Translated MICHAEL HOWARD, PETER PARET, *ON WAR*, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 1984, <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/EWS%20On%20War%20Reading%20Book%201%20Ch%201%20Ch%202.pdf>
- [26] *Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy: From Crimea to Ukraine*, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION “ORF”, 01 Mar 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russias-hybrid-warfare-strategy?fbclid=IwAR0431RoIW9G3PrfhJ118J6a00h22h5ZpxPJGx3vAViwrzVMtQYoodwgsL4>
- [27] *Ukraine: Cyberattack on communications, MPs phones blocked*, CNBC—By Reuters, 04 MAR 2014, <https://www.cnbc.com/2014/03/04/ukraine-cyberattack-on-communications-mps-phones-blocked.html>



**The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024**



- [28] *Russia's hybrid warfare strategy: From Crimea to Ukraine*, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION "ORF", 01 Mar 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russias-hybrid-warfare-strategy?fbclid=IwAR0431RoIW9G3PrfhJ118J6a00h22h5ZpxPJGx3vAViwrzVMtQYoodwgsL4>
- [29] Weiling Kong, Timothy Marler, *Ukraine's Lessons for the Future of Hybrid Warfare*, RAND, Nov 28 2022, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/11/ukraines-lessons-for-the-future-of-hybrid-warfare.html>
- [30] *Finland and Sweden submit applications to join NATO*, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 18 May 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm
- [31] *“The Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces on How to Win the War.”* Economist, 1 November 2023.
- [32] Jack Watling, *“The War in Ukraine is Not a Stalemate.”* Foreign Affairs, 3 January 2023.
- [33] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 77.
- [34] Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Concord, NH: Rumford Press, 1944), 80–82.
- [35] Guy Faulconbridge and Vladimir Soldatkin, *“Putin Vows to Fight on In Ukraine Until Russia Achieves its Goals,”* Reuters, 14 December 2023.
- [36] Harriet Morris, *“An Emboldened, Confident Putin Says There Will Be No Peace in Ukraine Until Russia’s Goals are Met,”* Associated Press, 14 December 2023.
- [37] Amos Fox, *“Myths and Principles in the Challenges of Future War,”* Association of the United States Army, Landpower Essay 23-7, 4 December 2023.
- [38] *“China’s Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,”* US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 31 December 2023; Robbie Gramer, *“Iran Doubles Down on Arms for Russia,”* Foreign Policy, 3 March 2023; Kim Tong-Hyung, *“North Korea Stresses Alignment with Russia Against US and Says Putin Could Visit at an Early Date,”* ABC News, 20 January 2024.
- [39] Tong-Hyung, *“North Korea Stresses Alignment with Russia”*; *“China’s Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”*; Darlene Superville, *“The White House is Concerned Iran May Provide Ballistic Missiles to Russia for Use Against Ukraine,”* Associated Press, 21 November 2023.
- [40] Margarita Konaev and Owen Daniels, *“The Russians Are Getting Better,”* Foreign Affairs, 6 September 2023.
- [41] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, *Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2023), 15–19.
- [42] Bryan Frederick et. al., *Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Risks for the Future* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023), 77.
- [43] *“Bluffing or Not, Putin’s Declared Deployment of Nuclear Weapons to Belarus Raises Tensions,”* Associated Press, 27 July 2023.
- [44] *“Russia’s Medvedev Warns of Nuclear Response if Ukraine Hits Missile Launch Sites,”* Reuters, 11 January 2024.
- [45] *“Ukraine War: Putin Confirms First Nuclear Weapons Moved to Belarus,”* BBC News, 17 June 2023.
- [46] Steve Gutterman, *“The Week in Russia: Carnage and Clampdown,”* Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 January 2024.
- [47] Samantha de Bondern et al., *“Prigozhin May Be Dead, but Putin’s Position Remains Uncertain,”* Chatham House, 24 August 2024.
- [48] Gutterman, *“The Week in Russia: Carnage and Clampdown.”*



The 19th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 7th-8th 2024



- [49] Robert Picheta et al., “Pro-War Putin Critic Igor Girkin Sentenced to Four Years in Prison on Extremist Charges,” CNN, 25 January 2024.
- [50] Robert Coalson, “How the Russian State Ramped Up the Suppression of Dissent in 2023: ‘It Worked in the Soviet Union, and It Works Now,’” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 December 2023.
- [51] Ben Hodges, “Ukraine Update with Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges,” Revolution in Military Affairs [podcast], 1 January 2024.
- [52] Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Putin’s Leadership Style: Ethnocentric Patriotism,” Security Dialogue 31, no. 3 (2000): 377–380.
- [53] Hodges, “The Ukraine Update.”
- [54] Olivia Olander, “Ukraine Intends to Push Russia Entirely Out, Zelenskyy Says as Counteroffensive Continues,” Politico, 11 September 2022; Guy Davies, “Zelenskyy to ABC: How Russia-Ukraine War Could End, Thoughts on US Politics and Putin’s Weakness,” ABC News, 9 July 2023.
- [55] Angela Charlton, “Ukraine’s a Step Closer to Joining the EU. Here’s What It Means, and Why It Matters,” Associated Press, 14 December 2023.
- [56] Visual Journalism Team, “Ukraine in Maps: Tracking the War with Russia,” BBC News, 20 December 2023.
- [57] “Russia-Ukraine Tensions: Putin Orders Troops to Separatist Regions and Recognizes Their Independence,” New York Times, 21 February 2022.
- [58] John Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,” International Security 13, no. 4 (1989): 65–70; Michael Kofman, “Firepower Truly Matters with Michael Kofman,” Revolution in Military Affairs [podcast], 3 December 2023.
- [59] Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin Warns West: Moscow Has ‘Red Line’ About Ukraine, NATO,” Associated Press, 30 November 2021.
- [60] Maria Kostenko et al., “As the War Grinds On, Ukraine Needs More Troops. Not Everyone Is Ready to Enlist,” CNN, 19 November 2023.
- [61] Trevor Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1979), 12.
- [62] Army Training Publication 3-06, Urban Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2022), 5-23.
- [63] Constantinescu, Maria, Assessing economic resilience in NATO countries: a comprehensive defense perspective, Military Thinking Journal, Volume 1, Pages 160-183, 2024
- [63] Kofman, “Firepower Truly Matters”; Franz-Stefan Gady, “A Russo-Ukrainian War Update with Franz-Stefan Gady,” Revolution in Military Affairs [podcast], 30 November 2023.