



The 13th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**
Braşov, November 8th-9th 2018



**THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINE CRISIS ON
REGIONAL SECURITY**

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Abstract:

The crisis in Ukraine triggered in early 2014 was a moment of inflection in the history of international relations. A number of specialists in political science sought to explain the reasons for the occurrence of such events in the 21st century and what implications they may have for the global security system, but especially the regional one. This paper analyzes the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis on regional security. The consequences of the occupation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation are also undermined.

Keywords: Regional security, impact, Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Russian Federation, Ukraine

1.Introduction

The crisis in Ukraine has serious implications for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole, which is clearly facing the worst threat to security since the end of the Cold War [3]. The Crimean theft has undoubtedly marked an inflection point in the current reality of the global scene. The manifestations of the Russian Federation have generated difficulties, including in the legal field, Crimean rapture, while marking the violation of international law. The crisis in Ukraine triggered in early 2014 was a moment of inflection in the history of international relations. A number of specialists in political science sought to explain the reasons for the occurrence of such events in the 21st century and what implications they may have for the global security system, but especially the regional one.

Making a retrospective analysis, it is worth mentioning that the transfer of the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine was the decision of the N. Khrushchev. Thus, in the period after the Second World War, in 1954, the Soviet government, under the leadership of N. Khrushchev decided to transfer Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). The decision was

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announced in the Soviet press at the end of February 1954, eight days after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution authorizing the transfer on 19 February. The text of the resolution and some extracts from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet meeting of the USSR were published alongside a very short announcement. At that time, no further information was provided to the public about the reasons for the decision to transfer Crimea, the secret being maintained throughout the Soviet period. In 1992, immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, information on this episode appeared. A historical journal that was published during the USSR between 1955 and 1963 was resumed in 1992, including transcripts of declassified documents from the Soviet archives. Thus, the first issue addressed in this journal in 1992 contained a section devoted to the transfer of Crimea, including documents from the Presidential Archives, which are currently in the State Archives of the Russian Federation.

The documents confirm that this decision was originally approved by the Presidency of the Soviet Union Communist Party on January 25, 1954, paving the way for the USSR's approval of the resolution three weeks later by the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet. Thus, declassified files do not reveal anything, except for the two official justifications published in 1954: (1) the cession of Crimea was a "noble act from the part of the Russian people" to commemorate the 300 years since "reuniting Ukraine with Russia" (referring to the Pereiaslav Treaty signed in 1654 by the representatives of Czac Hetmanat with Tsar Aleksei I of Moscow) and "to highlight the Russian people's unlimited trust and love towards the Ukrainian people" and (2) the transfer was a natural consequence "proximity to the Crimea of Ukraine, the approximation of their economies and close agricultural and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the UkrSSS." However, historians denied that the decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine would have been based on the two justifications. Thus, despite the fact that in 1954 the 300 years since the signing of the Treaty of Pereislaw were celebrated, there is no connection between the treaty and the Crimean peninsula. The city of Pereislaw was located in the center of Ukraine, not far from Kiev, but far from the Crimea, and the treaty itself has nothing to do with the peninsula, which came under Russian control only 130 years later. It is true that the treaty marked an important step in this direction, but even after its signing, the relationship between the two states was subjected to wars and wars before the unification took place. Also, the idea that the transfer of Crimea would have been justified solely through the cultural and economic affinities of the Black Sea peninsula with Ukraine is exacerbated. In the 1950s, the Crimean population was 1.1 million people consisted of 75% ethnic Russians and 25% ethnic Ukrainians. Under these circumstances, Crimea was rather "Russian" than "Ukrainian". Although there were important economic and infrastructure links between this peninsula and Ukraine, the cultural ties with Russia were much stronger. In September 1953, Nikita Khrushchev was elected to the rank of secretary general of the Communist Party - a title synonymous with that of the Soviet Union leader.

The Russian Federation expressly accepted the format of Ukraine's independent borders in 1991, both through the Belovejskaia Puşcea agreement (December 8, 1991), which consented to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum signed in December 1994. On 27 of March 1994, a referendum was held in Crimea, with 78.4% from the 1.3 million voters agreeing with Crimea's autonomy towards Ukraine. On May 31, 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, which reaffirmed the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea. This agreement was complemented by the Black Sea Fleet Agreement which divided the former Soviet fleet and also involved the granting of port concessions by the Russian Federation, as is the case with Sevastopol. Under the provisions of this agreement, Russia has taken on a huge

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network of port facilities. On January 12, 1999, the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea came into force confirming the region as an inalienable part of Ukraine. The legal obligations assumed by the two states regarding respect for territorial integrity and the ban on the use of force have been regulated in a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements. These two principles are as clearly evident in both the UN Charter, Article 2 (4) 12, and the Helsinki Final Act.

There are also bilateral agreements containing very relevant provisions in this regard. One of these is the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994 to provide Ukraine with security guarantees as a result of its abandonment of Soviet nuclear weapons and its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this way, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia are committed to "respecting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and borders" and reaffirms that "the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat of force or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine other than for self-defense or otherwise in accordance with Charter of the United Nations. "Moreover, the three signatory states have pledged to urgently request a UN Security Council action to assist Ukraine if it becomes a victim of an aggression act. In turn, the Partnership, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty signed in 1997 between Ukraine and Russia reconfirmed the condition of inviolability of the borders between the two states and stipulates that the parties "will build mutually beneficial relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for their sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the non-use of force or the threat of violence, including economic means and other forms of pressure, the right of peoples to freely determine their destiny, non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, cooperation between states, the honest fulfillment of the international obligations assumed and other norms recognized by international law. "Another relevant treaty concerning the legal obligations between Russia and Ukraine is the Black Sea Fleet, which the two parties signed in 1997. Thus, it was agreed to share the Black Sea fleet equally, with the indication that the Russian Federation could buy some of the most modern ships to be returned to Ukraine. Moscow also leased port facilities in both Sevastopol port and other Crimean ports for a period of 20 years at an extremely advantageous price. In 2010, this agreement was prolonged by Viktor Yanukovich until 2042, known as the Kharkov Accord, whereby Russia also undertook to provide Ukraine with natural gas at a reduced price. Also, the Black Sea Fleet Agreement allows the presence of Russian troops in the Crimea, but it is a small presence. With the annexation of the Crimea, Vladimir Putin argued that these bilateral treaties were no longer mandatory, since Russia did not reach any agreement with the new Kiev regime following a revolution.

Given that the Ukrainian crisis is far from being resolved, a number of regional threats have been identified with the development of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. The illegal action of Moscow gave rise to fears both among the Western states, but especially among the states in the wider Black Sea region. Illegal annexation of the former Ukrainian peninsula Crimea has increased Russia's security posture in the wider Black Sea region so that from the military point of view, Crimea can serve as an outpost to expand the power projection to Ukraine, Romania and Turkey. Among the major consequences of the rapture of the Ukrainian peninsula is the shift in power relations in the wider Black Sea region. Taking into account that in Sevastopol, the Russian Federation maintains over 70% of its military fleet, the annexation process has provided Moscow with a capability to design its capabilities to the Mediterranean. Moreover, Russian leaders have set out a very ambitious

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plan to modernize their armed forces, so that the Crimean military facilities are to be supplemented. During the military operations of Crimea and Donbas, followed by the Syrian air campaign, Russia unveiled the new capabilities acquired with the launch of its modernization program [4].

Ukraine's political crisis begins in November 2013, as the Government has announced the end of the state's eurointegration process, resulting in its overthrow on February 22, 2014. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis is the consequence of the initialing of the Ukraine Association Agreement with the EU, which had a problematic character in relations with the Russian Federation [8, p. 167]. During the rule of President L. Kravchuk in Ukraine's foreign policy, the vector versus the West was oriented. Also, the coming president V. Yushchenko in 2004 strengthened the western vector of Ukraine's foreign policy, and the Russian-Ukrainian relations go from partnership to confrontation.

Another premise behind the Russian-Ukrainian crisis is Ukraine's backing of the Saakashvili regime in Georgia, with which it has tried to form the "Democratic Choice Community" in the CIS, or a pro-Western cordon around the Russian Federation. Also, the approaching of Ukraine to NATO, supporting the location of the anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe has conditioned the negative reaction from the Russian Federation. Analyzing the events in Ukraine through the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation and the West, we can see that Ukraine has become the scene of disputes and confrontations of these geopolitical actors. The EU is interested in including Ukraine in its sphere of influence. For Europe, Ukraine is not only a huge territory with a population of 46 million. but it can serve as a shield in ensuring the security of the neighboring states at its border. States that will form the health cordon, according to the interests of the EU, must become supporters of democratic values and become market outlets for European goods respectively. Although the liberalization of Ukrainian markets is in favor of the EU's trade policy, it can serve as a blow to the promotion of Ukrainian native goods on their own markets [23, p.39].

Although the Association Agreement with the EU is initialed, its implementation is lasting. As a strategic outcome, Crimea was annexed to the Russian Federation, which fortified the Russian space in the religious, cultural and historical space, contributing to the strengthening of Russia's position in the Black Sea Basin. Also, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula to Russia signifies the formation of an image of the contemporary victory, made after 1945, as well as the demonstration that the Russian territories can be returned peacefully, to the increase of the national consciousness, and the confrontation between the West and the East continues. Territorial annexation of Crimea also has some negative processes, which have changed the architecture of East European space. The breakdown of trade and economic relations with the West, the destruction of the currency system, the rise in prices and the destabilization of the financial situation of the citizens, have led to the transition to new standards, the change of status of some objects [34, p. 167].

Analyzing the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, they are heavily criticized by the Western states. Thus, on March 18, 2014, by approving the Federal Law no. 36 F-3, with the approval of 443 votes and 1 against [19], the international treaty between the Russian Federation and the Crimea [21] on the acceptance of the Russian Federation of the Crimea Republic and the formation of a new subject in Russia is taking place. Under the Treaty that entered into force on March 21, 2014, Crimea is considered as a component part of the Russian Federation, consisting of a new federation subject - the Republic of Crimea and the city of federal importance Sevastopol, and the citizens who lived at that time on the territory are recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation, having the right to decide on their citizenship within one month of signing the Treaty.

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Becoming the subject of the Russian Federation, the legislation of the Russian Federation comes into force on the territory of Crimea. As a result of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the city of Sevastopol, the demarcation of the state borders between the Russian Federation and Ukraine takes place. The land borders between the Crimea and Ukraine are declared as the border between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and the borders in the Black Sea and Azov Sea area are subject to delimitation according to the principles of international law. Another benchmark by which the Russian Federation justifies its actions in Ukraine is the decision on the validation of the Treaty, focusing on the results of the free choice of the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on March 16, 2014, as a result of which Crimean citizens took the decision to unite the Russian Federation with the rights of the subjects of the Russian Federation and against "the establishment of the Crimean Constitution Act of 1992 and the Crimean Constitution as part of Ukraine. In this context, on March 17, 2014, President V. Putin by Presidential Decree no. 147 On the Recognition of Crimean Republic [39], taking into account the right of states to determine their fate, recognizes the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign state - a subject of international law [28, pp. 54-55].

Thus, according to the Russian Federation's Constitution, approved by unanimous vote on December 12, 1993 [24], it is stipulated that acceptance of a new subject in the Russian Federation is carried out in accordance with federal law and constitutional law (art. 65, point 2). According to art. 4, point 2, acceptance of a "foreign state or a part of it" is made on the basis of mutual agreement between the Russian Federation and the respective state in accordance with the principles of international law, especially since the initiator of the proposed incorporation in the composition of Russia is the foreign state (Article 6, point 1), ie the Republic of Crimea.

In accordance with international law and the principles of international law, two new subjects - the Republic of Crimea and the city of federal significance Sevastopol (Article 2 of the Treaty) [21] became part of the Russian Federation. Also, according to the principle of international law, any state has the right to conclude international treaties, and the signing of the International Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Crimean Republic is of historic importance [28, p. 54].

The document, which, according to the position of the Russian Federation, ratified its actions in the Crimea is the Declaration on the Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, which was approved by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on March 11, 2014 [20]. Thus, according to the Declaration, the peoples' right to self-determination and the recognition and support of the UN International Court of Justice on Kosovo on June 22, 2010, whereby the unilateral declaration of a state party does not violate the rules of international law. According to the ruling of the International Court of Justice, "there are no bans on unilateral declines of independence that do not stem from the Security Council's practice. "International law does not contain any prohibition on the unilateral declaration of the independence of a state or territory. This idea was declared on 18 March 2014 by President V. Putin [18]. It is also worth mentioning that, according to Chapter 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine [25], the right of the population to self-determination also affects Crimea, according to Russia's position [28, p. 54-55]. An argument about the justification of the Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine is also the organization of the Crimean referendum. The referendum, according to Russia's position, would have been illegal if there had been a constitutional government. In the case of a government that has come to power through illegal channels, it can not forbid the right to self-determination of the population of the peninsula [42].

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Another argument brought by Russia to justify its actions in the Crimea are the treaties signed between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. According to the Russian position, there was no illegal intervention in the Crimea. The treaties signed between the Russian Federation and Ukraine allowed the Russian Army to be found in the Crimea at that time. Thus, according to the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine of 31 May 1997 [22] and the Kharkov Agreement of 21 April 2010 [35], finding the Russian military forces on the territory of Crimea is legal.

Some researchers, for example G. Mirsamaier, believe that the Russian-Ukrainian crisis is conditioned by the West's involvement in this area. Intending to bring Ukraine out of the Russian Federation's sphere of influence [29, p.55], which, being geared towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, caused the West to trigger the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. The Russian Federation in the 1990s opposed NATO enlargement in the East, and the organization's proximity to the Russian frontiers by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2004 makes it indifferent to what is happening in East-European space. enlargement of NATO and the EU (through the accession of Croatia in 2013) to the East European region is detrimental to the interests and security of the Russian Federation [30].

Thus, the Russian Federation returns to the circle of world powers, but its return is not welcomed by Western states. Although the Russian Federation raises arguments in favor of and justifying its actions in Ukraine, the US and European states regard them as illegal, contrary to the principles of international law. By resolution of 4 February 2015, the European Parliament called on the Russian Federation to negotiate with Ukraine on the issue of Crimea. Also, taking into account paragraph A of the European Parliament Resolution of 4 February 2015 [39], the Russian Federation has violated international law, including the UN Statute [5], the Helsinki Final Act [13] and the 1997 Treaty with Ukraine on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet. [11] On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262 on "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine denies the validity of the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol [9].

Attitude towards the actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol was also manifested by the UN Human Rights Committee, which adopted a resolution condemning the "temporary occupation" of Crimea by Russia. The UN also reiterated that the Crimean Peninsula is Ukraine. For the first time in a United Nations official document it is clear that the Crimean Peninsula is a "temporary occupied territory". In addition, the resolution calls on Russia to stop abuses against the people of Crimea, to release illegally imprisoned Ukrainians and to allow international observers to monitor the situation. 73 countries voted to adopt the document, 76 abstained, and 23 voted against, including Russia, Syria, North Korea and Venezuela. Among the countries opposed to the resolution were China, Iran, India, Syria, South Africa, Serbia and North Korea. Many Latin American and African countries have abstained. The Crimean Peninsula was part of the Russian territory, but it was ceded in 1954 to Ukraine, at that time republic of the Soviet Union. The region has maintained close ties with Russia throughout this time, thanks to the large number of ethnic Russians living here, about 70% of the population. Despite these historical circumstances used by Russia to justify the annexation, the international community says that such an act is illegal and still considers the peninsula to be Ukrainian territory. The annexation of Crimea by Russia has violated numerous international commitments, including provisions of the UN Charter, The Final Act of the OSCE in Helsinki and the 1997 Treaty with Ukraine on the Status and Conditions for the Black Sea Fleet. [11] Also on November 15, 2016 in New York, 193 UN member states

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participated to the vote on the Crimean resolution. 73 states signed the resolution, 23 said, "against, 76 abstained, and 21 states did not vote [12].

In this context, the provisions of the Memorandum on Security Assurance and Ukraine's Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapon of Budapest, signed between the leaders of the Russian Federation, USA, Ukraine and Great Britain on December 5, 1994, are also included. Analyzing the provisions of art. 1 of the Memorandum, the Russian Federation, together with the United Kingdom, confirms respect for the independence, sovereignty and inviolability of Ukraine's existing frontiers. Also, according to art. 2 of the Memorandum, the Russian Federation assumes responsibility for refraining from threats or the threat of force that would violate Ukraine's territorial integrity and political independence [31, p. 59].

The actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, which resulted from the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, are criticized by Western leaders. In this context, the attitude of Great Britain, represented by Prime Minister D. Kameron, which together with G7 partners criticized the actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea, not recognizing the referendum and considering it as an annexation of foreign territories, which contravenes international law [14, p. 39]. The same view is supported by former US President B. Obama, French President F. Hollande and German Chancellor Merkel. The position of Western leaders is also supported by international organizations such as the UN Security Council, the OSCE and the European Council [1]. Attitude towards the actions of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine was also taken by the Eastern European member states of the EU. If we are analyzing Hungary's position on Russia, then the position of this state is neutral. Against the backdrop of rampant agitation caused by events in eastern Ukraine in a speech on May 10, 2014, Hungarian President N. Orban stressed that Hungary, although a member of the EU and NATO, is not the prisoner of these organizations and has the right to have friendship with the neighboring states, including the Russian Federation [38, p.10].

Slovakia has a double position vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. Unlike President A. Kiski, who has an anti-Russian stance, Slovak Prime Minister R. Fišo believes that "the Russian-Ukrainian crisis would not have been triggered if the EU had not given unrealistic hopes of Ukraine joining the European community [37, p.11]. In Bulgaria's policy on US sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis two stages can be distinguished. Until August 2014, between the institution of the president and the government there are divergences. P. Oresarski's government and the Bulgarian parliament speak for a balanced position in relations with the Russian Federation, and after the removal of Oresarski from power, the new Prime Minister B. Borisov takes a solid position with that of President P. Plevneliev, who is a tough one towards Russia [38, p. 17-18].

Unlike Hungary's neutral or double position in relations with the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic occupies a position centered on pragmatism. In the opinion of Czech President M. Zeman, the sanctions of the West on the Russian Federation have caused the interstate relations between the Czech Republic and Russia to diminish, which is affecting the country's economic situation. Czech Foreign Minister L. Zaoralek, who is in favor of tightening Western sanctions against the Russian Federation [38, p. 14], has a position opposite that of the Czech President. This is also the opinion of Polish political leaders. Polish political forces appreciate the actions of the Russian Federation as aggressive in their relations with Ukraine. Polish Prime Minister D. Tusk believes the EU should not capitulate to Russia's actions, and MEP, ex-premier E. Buzek, believes the Russian Federation is one of the main threats to Poland's security. In this context, the interview of Polish President B. Komorovski, offered on September 18, 2014 to the New

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York Times, announces his intention to ask the UN General Assembly to reform the Security Council and to withdraw membership of the Russian Federation [38, p.16]. Romania's position on Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine are similar to that of Poland - the one that fully supports the sanctions of the West imposed on the Russian Federation [38, p. 19].

Putting us in an impartial position and analyzing the consequences of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, we are present at the geopolitical changes of the world map. Thus, drawing attention to the latest events between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, several consequences can be made relevant, which have conditioned the modification of the "new geopolitical architecture" of the East European space:

1. Russia gained strategic control over the entire Black Sea region, as the Crimean peninsula is placed in the center of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea basin. There has been considerable increase in Russia's ability to control maritime and air space in the Black Sea region. Russia has also gained unlimited control over the seafront fleet in Sevastopol, which allows it to modernize it and, in addition, it has obtained all its ports and military bases in the Crimea.

2. With the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Naval Forces of Ukraine were virtually destroyed, their system of dismantling and the training system for military cadres were destroyed. The Azov Sea Basin, under the control of the Kerch Strait, is currently under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Cardinal also changed the economic areas of the countries of the Black Sea basin. We observe that the changes are totally at the expense of Ukraine, which has lost not only about 70% of the exclusive economic area previously owned, but with the loss of control over the Straits of Kerch, loses total control over the Azov Sea [15, p. 34]. Two Ukrainian regions out of 27 go under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, and two others declare their independence [32, p. 101]. The loss of Donbass and the collapse of a considerable part of the eastern industry make Ukraine lose not only its regional leadership, but also its industrial and energy importance. The dependence of European states on Russian gas again contributes to the EU's rapprochement with the Russian Federation.

3. Another negative impact of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis on the Ukrainian territory is the risk and the possibility of being subjected to a territorial division. Taking into account the linguistic and ethnic peculiarities of the population on border areas between Ukraine and neighboring countries, Ukraine can also be divided into areas of responsibility of the Russian Federation, Poland, Romania [32, p73].

4. If Russia pays an annual fee for crossing the straits for both the military fleet and the merchant fleet, the situation is quite different nowadays. As a result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol, the Russian Federation obtains a status of equality with Turkey in the exclusive area, accounting for about 40% of the Black Sea basin; moreover, it de facto gains control of the Black Sea because its area is geographically disposed in the center of the sub-region [15, p.34].

5. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis also gave Belarus a new geopolitical role in the region. In Belarus, the partial transfer of the Ukrainian technology industry is already taking place. The most eloquent example is the initiation of the construction of military helicopters at the aircraft factory in Orşansk, the company "Motorsi". Another moment that strengthens the geopolitical role of the Republic of Belarus is the transfer of the Ukrainian military industry. Currently, Belarus has begun to occupy Ukraine's position. It has been commanded by Russia to annually manufacture 1.5 thousand military helicopters, and in the future it is expected to modernize and build armored equipment, military aircraft, missiles and including the missile system. Belarus also benefits from the transit of its

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territory by large Russian tonnage cars to the European space. This leads to the modernization and construction of terrestrial communications. Currently, Belarus is changing its status from a state of insignificant geostrategic importance, obtaining the status of a regional leader. The situation created in eastern Ukraine turns Belarus into an energetic knot between eastern and western space, becoming a much more important partner for the Russian Federation, compared to the period before the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. Also, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has given Belarus a new impetus in developing relations with the Russian Federation, building the CAE (the atomic power plant) in Belarus with Rostam's support and Russian investments as a result of the 2014 visit of D. Rogozin in Belarus. The Russian official has highlighted the new quality of Belarus for the Russian Federation [32].

6. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis also has an impact on the relations of the Balkan states with the Russian Federation. It contributed to the stimulation of the process of realizing the UEA (Atomo Electric Station) project in Hungary, while avoiding the territory of Ukraine, the construction of the "South Stream" oil pipeline was strained.

As a result of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, there is practically a change in the "geopolitical architecture" of Eastern Europe, and hence the role of the Black Sea Basin. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation is considered by the West as a threat to European security. As a result, the NATO reaction, under the pretext of ensuring the security of the European member states of the Alliance and of the entire European area, is to strengthen its presence in the area. The events in Ukraine have attracted the attention of the US, which, in turn, is developing a new strategy for the development of US maritime forces. The modernization of the Russian Armed Forces, illegal annexation of Crimea requires the involvement of NATO in order to ensure European security. The same opinion is supported by the former NATO Force Commander in Europe, Admiral G. Stavridis, and Admiral B. Williams [33] NATO Commander in the Black Sea Basin. Similar opinions also include the deputy director of the International Security Center of the Atlantic Council, R. Greimer, who considers it necessary to strengthen the presence of NATO in the Black Sea Basin. The Black Sea Basin is a strategic hub, it is the intersection of energy and trade routes between Europe, Central Asia, Turkey and the Russian Federation [33].

For the European Parliament (EP), the geostrategic change of the land, the development of the military infrastructure in the Black Sea basin denotes "serious problems after the end of the Cold War". The European states, in the opinion of the parliamentarians, must have an answer to all the actions of the Russian Federation, have to update the foreign policy, but also the military security policy in the EU Strategy for the Black Sea, all the more so if the strengthening of the presence Russia in eastern Europe, near the borders of the EU, including Romania, Poland, the Baltic States. Thus, according to the estimates made by the US Stratfor agency of the Black Sea basin situation after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the balance of forces in the region has changed, which has led to the corresponding response of NATO [34].

NATO has increased its presence in Europe to discourage Russia's possible military operations. NATO's "Anaconda 2016" has amounted to 31,000 soldiers from Poland, the United States and 17 other North Atlantic Alliance members (respectively from five partner countries), equipped with 3000 military vehicles, 105 airplanes and helicopters, plus 12 military ships, equipment from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea [2]. The NATO Exercise "Anaconda", planned in Poland, was the most important military event in the country's of modern history, attended by more than 27,000 soldiers from 22 countries [10]. Also, from May 30 to June 9, 2016, the NATO exercises of Saber Knight took place

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in the Estonian city of Tapa, attended by approximately 10000 NATO troops from 13 Member States [7].

During the NATO and Ukrainian military exercises in the Black Sea Basin, US Fleet 6 Fleet Commander G. Foggo promised on August 31, 2015, the use of the "right to free movement in the Black Sea basin of maritime forces as well as the permanent presence of the American fleet in the Black Sea basin and the granting of financial assistance from the US to Ukraine for the modernization of the armed forces. Exercises in the Black Sea Basin can be considered as the largest in NATO history, attended by 2,5 thousand troops (including 1,000 US Armed Forces). Four Navy ships, 2 submarines, planes, 6 helicopters, 40 mobile units under the aegis of the Pentagon participated in the exercises. For the purpose of the exercises, the Ukrainian side involved 1,000 soldiers, 9 NML ships, dozens of patrol stars of the border service, 8 airplanes, 8 helicopters, and 80 mobile units. The Military Sea Coalition area has served the Black Sea's water area, the Army's Army Polygony, the "Odessa School" military airfields, "Kulibakino" from Nikolaev, "Cernobaevka" in Herson, landing in Ociakovo, as well as Pervomaisk islands, Odessa International Airport, Odessa commercial-maritime port "Iujnii", Ociakovo Military Port (Nikolaev region).

The US desire to "be permanently present in the Black Sea Basin contradicts the Montreux Convention of 1936 on the legal status of the Black Sea basin which limits the presence of the naval vessels of non-riparian states in the Black Sea. The US, in accordance with the position of the Russian Federation, basically violates the provisions of the Convention [37].

In this context, the work of the Warsaw Summit of 8-9 July 2016 deserves attention. Paradoxically, it is a coincidence, or indeed, the city where the Warsaw Pact in 1955 was signed in which the union of the former members of the socialist camp, created by the former USSR, became the center of attention, and the decisions taken in the Summit has a direct impact, just like half a century ago, on the formation of the "new geopolitical architecture" of Eastern Europe [16]. The leaders of the NATO member states at the Summit on July 8-9 took the decision to deploy a 1,000-strong battalion on the territory of the Baltic States and Poland, consisting of US forces, Germany, Great Britain and Canada. Multinational formations will be in these countries on the basis of rotation already in 2017. In Lithuania - the German formations, in Latvia - the Canadian ones, in Estonia - those of Great Britain and in Poland - those of Canada [35]. According to statements by NATO Secretary General I. Stoltenberg, the term of battalions is not established. NATO does not want a confrontation with the Russian Federation, nor does it want an arms race. The concept of creating free EU and NATO democracies is not a completed process [17].

Thus in Turkey is installed the US anti-missile system radar, in Romania at Deveselu - the American complex Aegis Ashore, in Germany, at Ramstein air base is the missile attack planning center, and from May 13, 2016, in Poland, in Redzikovo, the construction of the Aegis Ashore complex was completed and will be completed in 2018 [35]. In this context, the publication of President Poroshenko's statement in The Wall Street Journal, which states that Ukraine and NATO will make an alliance to oppose Russia, deserves attention. Deputy US Security Adviser, B. Rods, said NATO would react to Russia's behavior in Ukraine by increasing its military force at its borders [41]. In reaction to the statements made by Westerners in May 2016, Russian Defense Minister S. Soigu said that the Alliance should be fortified at the Russian border in the future, it is necessary to strengthen the Russian presence of the Russian Federation in the area by creating three new divisions, 2 to the west and one to the south. The Russian Federation can install the Iskander missile complex in Kaliningrad [35].

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The issue of fortification of the Russian Federation in Eastern Europe was also declared by the Russian President V. Putin on May 27, 2016 in Athens. In his speech, President Putin stressed that the Russian Federation will react to the actions of installing the NATO anti-missile shield in Romania. Until recently Romania did not know the meaning of "being under the target, it is currently confronted with the fact that the Russian Federation will react to NATO policy. Russia does not have an offensive policy but a defensive policy and, to that end, will make every effort to defend its interests in the area. "[28]

Thus, subjecting the analysis to the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, we are once again preoccupied with the Western-Russian confrontation, and the dynamism of the contemporary world, in constant transformation, has altered the architecture of the Eastern European space. Political reality is increasingly focused on "global political instability, which demonstrates the erosion of the Westphalia system. International relations, centered on the principle of pluricentrism, contribute to the formation of a "new geopolitical architecture" in general, as well as, that of Eastern European space in particular. On the other hand, the destruction of the world system centered on the principle of Yalta - Potsdam.

However, we must accept an irreversible truth - the old cartography (referring to the Cold War period) of East European space no longer exists. As a result of the collapse of the USSR and the worldwide appearance of the 15 international law subjects, the former union republics, including the Republic of Moldova, can already state the presence of the change of the new geopolitical architecture of Eastern Europe. By obtaining the status of a subject of international law in 1991, the Republic of Moldova becomes a participant in the process of establishing the "new geopolitical architecture" of the Eastern European space, and a more detailed analysis of the Republic of Moldova's influence on the formation of this one refers more to some futurological behavioral scenarios of the state.

Thus, through the vector of foreign policy to integrate into the EU space, the Republic of Moldova (in case of accession to the EU space) would condition the change of the "new geopolitical architecture" of it. Although the Republic of Moldova is insignificant as territory, there would be an expansion of 33851 square kilometers of the EU in the East. The modification of the "new geopolitical architecture" of East European space would also be conditional on the eventual adherence of the state to the North Atlantic Alliance. Currently, according to the provisions of art. 11 of the Constitution, the Republic of Moldova is a neutral state, which implies the non-admission of the deployment of military troops of other states on its territory [6]. However, in the event of a possible scenario of Moldova's accession to NATO, there would also be a new extension of the Alliance to the East, which would contribute to diminishing the influence of the Russian Federation in the area, a fact not accepted by Russia. Russia's failure to admit the diminution of influence in East-European space is officially declared and stipulated in the basic documents - the conceptions of the Russian Federation's foreign policy in 2014 and 2016. Thus, according to the provisions of art. 57 and 58 of Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, [27] Russia recognizes the neighboring states of Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, including the Republic of Moldova as a zone of geopolitical interest and sphere of influence. In the event of a possible dismemberment of the Republic of Moldova from the status of neutrality and NATO membership, the consequences of such actions would be significant - the possibility of starting a direct geopolitical confrontation between the US, NATO on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other part.

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