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US Defense Budget and Military Capabilities

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Abstract:

The paper explores how the capabilities-based approach is reflected by the fiscal construct of the US FY 2015 Defense Budget. Briefly tackles with the defense transformation concept, then, in the first part, describes the capabilities-based planning methodology, as the logical embodiment of transformational paradygm. First chapter attempts to define the concept of capability, from the identifying process, to the palpable, fielded operational instrument. Second part of the paper provides a personal image of the Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Budget, from the capabilities-based approach perspective and the relationship with two strategic planning documents.

Key words: Transformation, uncertainty, Capabilities-Based Planning, capability, ability, Strategic Guidance, future force, Fiscal Year, budget, Quadrennial Defense Review,

1. Introduction

Defense transformation is a process which, by definition, has no end state. It is a continuous adaptation of concepts, organizations, and technologies ultimately aimed to achieve superiority across the entire spectrum of defense related areas. In a global security environment that shifted from bipolarization, conventional and nuclear military competition to aggressive political visions and extremism (under all its manifestations), transformation has been perceived as the logical vehicle through which the national interests and instruments of power are reshaped in order to meet new challenges. To fulfill its adaptive function, the transformational paradigm required an appropriate set of tools capable of translating theoretical possibilities into factual commitments, such as concepts, methodologies, processes, and means.

Placed at the core of defense transformation array of concepts, the capabilities-based approach takes transformation to the next step, from conceptual development to physical capabilities designed to meet specific operational requirements. Future-oriented, the capabilities-based approach intends to provide a package of practical means by determining capability requirements for the development of joint operating concepts and execution of an extensive range of tasks a military force will need to accomplish in order to defeat a potentially unpredictable, elusive, and increasingly capable adversary. In essence, the capabilities-based approach allowed the defense planning domain to change from the former threat-based model to a future capabilities model [1].

In the context of considerable budgetary difficulties, an eroded domestic support for the global role of America and an increased level of strategic and fiscal uncertainty, ensuring the appropriate military capabilities for the US military poses significant challenges in identifying and investing the appropriate level of resources.

2.Military Capability Concept – the US model

The US Department of Defense defines capabilities-based planning as "*a planning methodology that identifies and provides capabilities that the joint warfighter and supporting defense entities need to address a range of challenges*" [2].

The US approach to capabilities-based planning is known as the ***Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA)***. It consists of a top-down capability need identification methodology that can be depicted in simple terms as a step-by-step analysis process that uses the existing guidance (such as DoD Strategic Guidance and Joint Operations Concepts) as initial input, in order to sequentially answer the following questions [3]:

- What are we talking about?
- How good are we at doing it?
- What should we do about it?

In other words, the analysis identifies the problem (the issue, or the *need*), evaluates the current available capacities, and recommends a suitable course of action.

Conceptually not very far from any other problem-solving algorithm the process is, however, complex, interlacing a vast amount of inputs, intermediate products, and examination sub-processes. The coherence and effectiveness of CBA is ensured through the framework provided by the ***Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)***, a construct put in place in 2003 [3] under the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) with the primary role of supporting him and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in "*identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs*" [4].



Fig. 1 – US approach to Capability-Based Planning Process [1]

As the diagram from the figure 1 shows, JCIDS also provides the necessary outputs for the capability acquisition segment and for the PPBE process as well. Recognizing that different capabilities may require different policy approaches, a certain level of procedural flexibility has been built into the integrated architecture of the system.

2.1. Defining the concept

What is a capability? The DoD Directive No. 7045.20 (2008) provides the following definition: "*The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and ways across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action*"[2]

From processual perspective, the capability represents the embodiment of an operational requirement(s) package derived from a transformational concept. It provides a field commander - at tactical, operational, or strategic level- with an interdependent cluster of physical means, operational concepts, and structural constructs that will allow him to execute a mission or task within given parameters.

In my personal opinion, the key word of the aforementioned definition is "*ability*". It is not the purpose of this paper to debate semantics, nevertheless, this term (as oppose to another one, such as "*capacity*") describes best the embedded proactive and decisiveness characteristics of a capability. I also consider that "*ability*" emphasizes the conceptual "departure" from the threat-based model. Though we can still associate the capability concept to a classical, "force-on-force" set of scenarios, the current approach had also incorporated the unpredictable dimension and asymmetric nature of a potential future conflict. Moreover, it encompasses an appropriate level of flexibility in order to perform under uncertainty.

A capability is more than a weapon system (even a highly technologically advanced one) or a highly trained and well equipped tactical formation. A nuclear-powered attack submarine (a "hunter-killer") can *detect and track,* or *engage and destroy* hostile submarines or surface ships; also, using high-tech precision munitions (such as cruise missiles) it can *strike* ground targets, deep inside the landmass. Therefore it is capable of delivering/applying/achieving *a desired effect*. It is operated by a highly specialized and well trained complement of officers, petty officers, and servicemen (thus meeting the *personnel* criterion), and can navigate undetected underwater basically for an unlimited period of time (*specified standards and conditions*). However, it can be only in one place at a given time, the food reserves aboard will eventually be depleted and the submarine itself, as a complex piece of machinery, will need at some point to be put on a dry dock for scheduled maintenance, repairs, or systems upgrading. Finally, the crew will depend on external sources for mission updates and situational awareness.

Other entities are needed o conduct resupply, perform maintenance and provide command and control, entities that belongs to a higher organization such as the Navy. The Navy subordinates the Submarine Force as the *organizational* structure, for which it provides *doctrinal* background and performs *operational planning*, ensures *leadership* through established chain of command (Submarine Warfare Division), *educates* and *trains* replacement personnel, and delivers *materiel* support through depots and shipyards, as specialized *facilities.*

Taking into account all the above we can conclude that, while one submarine represents a highly *capable* weapon system, the US Navy's Submarine Force can be considered as a *capability*.

US DEFENSE BUDGET AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The range of the current, projected, and planned capabilities extends across the entire operational spectrum, vertically from tactical to strategic level, and horizontally through a standardized set of capabilities packages named Joint Capability Areas.

A ***capabilities-based force*** should display the ability to defeat an enemy or manage any situation by effectively conducting operations in any type of environment, including complex settings, or remote and austere locations. In order to do that, such a force should be optimally sized, appropriately shaped, and properly postured. ***The Army Operating Concept (AOC***) [5] provides us with an example on how a single Service – The US Army in this case - defines and describes its own vision of a future capabilities-based force.

According with AOC concept, in order to win a future capabilities-based force must:

- *Simultaneously approaches the all three levels of war* – tactical, operational, and strategic – so it can deal with the increased level of uncertainty of the next conflict;
- Put a potential adversary in the situation of facing *multiple dilemmas* by implementing the newly developed concept named *Joint Combined Armed Operation;*
- Provide the field commander with *multiple options*, that will allow him to fight and win across the entire operational spectrum, from large scale combined operations to limited, non-kinetic actions;
- *Effectively integrate the potential of multiple partners*, in order to ensure the "competitive advantage"[5] over any given adversary;
- Incorporate *innovative and evolving dimensions* to guarantee continuously adaptability.

The AOC concept also formulates a set of broadly defined "*foundational*" capabilities which will allow the future force to optimally integrate military, non-military, and multinational components. Briefly, these capabilities are [5]:

- The ability to develop and maintain a high level of situational awareness;
- The ability to shape the battlespace, engage key players/actors;
- The ability to provide the appropriate level of security assistance to a potential partner or host nation;
- Maintain institutional *agility*;
- Prevent, eliminate, or mitigate the threat of use of WMD and other kinds of high power explosives against the force itself, the friendlies, and civilian population;
- Conduct homeland operations against emerging threats;
- Guarantee the ability to continuously secure access to critical information and communication infrastructure;
- Educate and train, in order to develop resilient soldiers, adaptive leaders, and robust teams;
- The ability to project forces, develop the situation, and rapidly seize the initiative;
- Achieve and maintain area security;
- Achieve unity of effort through effective integration across the entire operational spectrum;
- The ability to conduct effective combined and joint maneuver in complex environment;
- Maintain strategic agility and freedom of movement and maneuver;
- The ability to conduct effective target acquisition, fires integration and delivery across the spectrum;
- Visualize the situation and assess the operations to achieve and maintain initiative;
- Design flexible formations/units for rapid deployment and conduct operations across the spectrum.

To achieve the abovementioned capabilities, AOC concentrates the technological support development into the following areas:

- Mobile, protected, and accurate firepower platforms;
- Increased lethality and effects through advanced munitions, platforms, sensors, and mission command systems;
- Logistics optimization by increasing unit self-sufficiency, lower consumption, efficient storage, timely and precision resupply;
- Improved Army aviation effectiveness by exploiting the advantages of VTOL technology, and advancements in range, speed, payload and performance;
- Advanced processing, improved analytic fusion tools, and cyber-attack resistant networks;
- Human performance optimization, and medical sciences advancements;
- Autonomy-enabled systems, as force multipliers, to maintain "overmatch".

2.2. Major components

Attempting to describe the internal construct of any given capability, two major areas are immediately coming under attention: the DOTMLPF "model" which provides a structural image and the "building blocks" approach that can help us understanding how certain capabilities are being put together, especially from resources availability/allocation perspective.

DOTMLPF stands for *Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel,* and *Facilities.* The *Joint Capabilities Development System Manual* [6] adds *Policy* as well, and approaches DOTMLPF-P as an analytical component of the Capability-Based Assessment (CBA).

Most of the US military capabilities-related documents describe DOTMLPF in quite similar terms [4]. A concise description of the terms may be the following:

- *Doctrine* encompasses the set of fundamental principles that generally guides a military force's actions toward a specified objective;
- *Organization* depicts the entity (or entities) related to a certain capability, and the structural arrangements that enable different components of the entity to systematically cooperate towards the established goal, or mission accomplishment;
- *Training* includes the whole set of training events, general and mission oriented rehearsals, from the individual to staff and unit level, using the conceptual and procedural support of the doctrinal facet;
- *Materiel* reflects the entire set of items or assets, such as vehicles, aircrafts, ships, and other types of weapon systems (including their respective spare parts and support equipment) necessary to equip and operate the physical component of the capability;
- *Leadership and Education* is related to the appropriate level of professional development of the field commander, and the educational process that ensures the respective individual professional competence;
- *Personnel* indicates the qualified personnel requirement for the proper support of a certain capability;
- *Facilities* component consists of the real property, such as any physical structure (buildings, enclosures, lanes, utility systems) and the respective underlying land related to a specific capability. It can either be command and control installations or production industrial facilities, as well.

At the level of armed forces, the DOTMLPF components can be reorganized, as major capability components, in four groups:

- *Force structure*, related to the organizational aspects of the force, such as the total number of personnel, composition of the armed forces, the number and the nature of units belonging to each Service;
- *Modernization*, related to the technological posture of the forces;
- *Readiness*, which can be regarded as a measurement scale of the individual units capability to deliver the expected output, and
- *Sustainability*, as a fundamental function in maintaining the established level of readiness and the operational tempo toward the achievement of the designated objective.

The "building blocks" approach emphasizes on ***modularity***, as a mean to mitigate the effects of uncertainty over the pool of resources. In essence, the building block concept suggests that capabilities should be developed at generic level, in order to be properly "assembled" according to a specific emerging need. In his 2002 monography on the capabilities-based planning Paul K. Davis [7] identifies four types of building blocks:

- *Units*, such as ground tactical formation, air wings, or naval groups;
- *Operations*, as military activities aimed to accomplish a specific objective;
- *Operational concepts*, as the doctrinal guidance needed to conduct operations;
- *Resources* in the form of physical means or assets and enabling infrastructure.

This approach brings upfront few issues: to what level an assembly capability can be incorporated in the design of a building block; rapid and flexible assembly may require as well some "special tailoring" at both the conceptual level and the physical one; finally, regular support structures may fail to provide for the entire organization, once it focuses on supporting a low-level building block unit.

2.3. US strategic planning documents

Fielded capabilities, both current and future are intrinsic tied to the relevant Strategic Guidance, mainly through the CBA process. The strategic planning documents form a chain that, among other things, provides the bridge between the broad strategic level and the more concrete worlds of planning, programming and budgeting while providing organizing framework, highlighting priorities, and enabling performance standards.

The **National Security Strategy (NSS)** states that *"to succeed, we must balance and integrate all elements of American power and update our national security capacity for the 21st century"* [8]. Though is the fundamental paper from the national defense perspective, the NSS does not contain explicit inputs for the CBA process.

US National Defense Strategy (NDS): "*Meeting the challenges requires better and more diverse capabilities in both hard and soft power, and greater flexibility and skill in employing them"* [9]. The NDS provides concrete guidance for the CBA process: security challenges, strategic and operational priorities, and key capabilities. The operational context and the detail level are expanded by the **National Military Strategy and the Joint Concepts (Operating, Functional, and Integrating).** In 2012 a new document – the **Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)** – has been issued. Emphasizing on the unpredictability of the future strategic environment, the DSG stresses the necessity of maintaining *"a broad portfolio of military capabilities that […] offer versatility across the range of missions […]"* [10].

Several other documents, mostly issued at the DoD level, are inducing effects throughout CBA process: **Unified Command Plan (UCP), Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).** The later provides a comprehensive review of the DoD performance and may result in significant changes at the

strategic level. Related to this paper topic, the 2001 QDR described for the first time the concept of capabilities-based approach.



Fig. 2 – Relationships of US Key Strategic Documents [3]

3.Military Capabilities as a component of the US Defense Budget

3.1. Section 1 – US Defense Budget structure and composition

In absolute numbers, Obama Administration requested for the Fiscal Year 2015 a total of $560.4 billion to fund Department of Defense. By comparison, the FY2015 budget is smaller with 1.7% than the previous year Defense Budget, however consistent with the budget caps established by the Budget Control Act (BCA) in 2011. In more details, FY 2015 consists of $495.6 billion in the base discretionary segment, $6.2 in mandatory funding, and approximately $59 billion for the so-called Overseas Contingency Operations.

Fiscal Year	Defense Base Budget* (Billions of Dollars)
FY 2011	528
FY 2012	530
FY 2013	496
FY 2014	496
FY 2015	496
FY 2016	535
FY 2017	544

**Rounded numbers*

Fig. 3 – US Defense Budget trend, previous and current QDR [11]

Analyzed against the provisions of 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review projections, the FY2015 Defense Budget appears to be insufficient to cover the whole range of defense programs indicated in the mentioned

strategic documents, especially from the Future Years Defense Programs (FYDP) perspective. The FYDP projection for the next 5 years already exceeds the BCA established cap by roughly $116 billion. Moreover, the budget assumes for the next period a series of major savings, considered by many analysts unlikely to occur. Additionally, there is a significant degree of probability that the acquisition programs will exceed the projected costs, as it happened before. In his *FY 2015 Defense Budget Analysis* Todd Harrison [12] concludes that there is a definite gap between the de 2014 QDR defense programs and the currently in effect budget caps. In other words, there is an unbalance between strategies and resources that can increase the risk posed by the currently under-resourced programs.

From the very beginning, the FY 2015 Defense Budget highlights its design philosophy of protecting *"capabilities that are the most closely aligned to the pillars of the defense strategy – defend the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively"* [13]. In support of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the budget overview lists the following as the key general themes of the fiscal construct:

- *Seek a Balanced Force,* related with the choices that have to be made in order to achieve a modern force, capable of accomplishing the whole range of missions;
- *Prepare for Prolonged Readiness Challenges,* that stresses on the importance of maintaining a high level of readiness of the forces, and the effort to be made in 2015 in order to restore readiness level affected by the sequestration cuts in FY 2014;
- *Continue to Focus on Institutional Reform,* which describes the projected savings areas, as aforementioned in this section;
- *Pursue Compensation Changes,* that seek to reduce the growing trend in the military pay and health care costs;
- *Pursue Investments in Military Capabilities* in order to ensure the capabilities needed to guarantee the achievement of nation's security objectives;
- *Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative,* as a distinct instrument designed to outgrowth economic progress and strengthen national security.

3.2. Protect, maintain and modernize the Military Capabilities

In recent years, the US Department of Defense decreased the rate of purchases in the field of weapons systems and equipment, mostly due to the reduction requirements of BCA and the 2013 Bipartisan Budget Act (2013). Using the Opportunity, Growth, and Security (OGS) Initiative DoD plans on accelerate the development and the acquisition of Upgraded systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), aircrafts, rotary wing assets, ground vehicles, and communication systems. OGS Initiative considers both, the purchase of available systems, and the modernization programs.

Improving the DoD facilities is another domain that OGS Initiative helped in identifying additional resources for the Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) program. However, the FY 2015 base budget provides funding for the near term SRM, but not enough for the long-term deterioration.

After over a decade of war the Joint Force is considered to be currently out of balance [13]. The FY 2015 Budget Request was delivered along with the 2014 QDR; however an apparent discrepancy has been noted between the two regarding the force level reduction, in the sense that the budget does not actually fund the force level specified in the 2014 QDR [12].

Related to the Joint Force, FY2015 states the will of the DoD to take the necessary steps to preserve the following capability areas:

- *Cyber capabilities and operations;*
- *Missile Defense;*

- *Nuclear Deterrence;*
- *Space-based Systems;*
- *Precision Strike;*
- *Intelligence, Surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)Systems;*
- *Counter Terrorism and Special Operation.*

Concerning the readiness and modernization the level of funding still poses some significant challenges. To address this, the FY 2015 request contains a budget plan for the 2016-2019 period, with the declared objective of promoting *"a smaller-but-more-capable ready and modern force"*[13]. The budget Overview offers some examples related to the low readiness levels, such as 2 out of 43 active duty brigade combat teams (BCT) fully operational, or 13 US Air Force combat units grounded for several months.

Current $ in billions	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY15 – FY19 TOTAL
FY 2014 PB	540.8	551.4	560.0	568.6	577.1	2,797.9
FY 2015 PB	495.6	535.1	543.7	551.4	559.0	2,684.9
Delta	-45.2	-16.2	-16.2	-17.2	-18.1	-113.0
Real Growth		**+6.3%**	**-0.1%**	**-0.5%**	**-0.6%**	**+1.3%***

Fig. 4 – DoD proposed Outyear Topline for the Defense Base Budget [13]

3.3. Generating Service and Joint Capabilities

The FY 2015 request highlights the responsibilities of the Services in achieving the operational requirements, each one by performing its own force generation process. These processes are different due to the specifics of the capabilities which are to be produced.

While already in a full process of reorganization, the **Army** focuses on developing quick deployment capabilities, in the same time reducing the overall size of all its components. The following key transition initiatives are considered:

- *Army Contingency Force (ACF);*
- *Regionally Aligning Forces;*
- *Brigade Combat Team Re-organization;*
- *Army Aviation Restructure.*

Facing similar challenges, the **Navy** concentrates on ensuring the forward presence through a combination of assets, including oversea bases, temporary or austere installations, and partner nations. Related to the force generation process, in 2015 Navy is to commit the transit to an "optimized' Fleet response Plan (O-FRP).

Unique among the other services, the **Marine Corps** seeks to maintain its expeditionary abilities by fulfilling operational requirements such as the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), specially "tailored" units currently operating around the clock in African and European proximities. As far as the technological dimension the US Marine Corps remains committed to the *Amphibious Combat Vehicle* program.

In order to generate **Air Force** readiness the FY 2015 employs a set of five interrelated, non-linear main tools:

- *Flying Hour Program;*
- *Weapons System Sustainment;*
- *Training Resources Availability;*
- *Critical Skills Availability;*
- *Deploy-to-dwell.*

At the same time, the budget maintains on track the major three modernization programs: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, KC-46 Multi-role Tanker, and LRS-B Bomber.

Despite the more than a decade of combat operations the US **Special Operations Command** still maintains a superior level of readiness, and the FY 2015 is committed to keep the trend by supporting the implementation of an enhanced SOF generation model, and the Services-provided capabilities.

Beyond the Services, FY 2015 addresses the investments in the **joint readiness**, especially in capability areas such as combined effects, cyber operations, precision application of fires, unmanned aerial vehicles, and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.

The need for large **joint training** events has been recognized, to develop regional expertise and perfect relationship between Services and partners. Understanding US partners' **language and culture** as a mean to boost the overall effectiveness of the force, has been recognized, as well. The FY 2015 is designed to provide assistance to the process of increasing the level of *language-enabled personnel.*

The FY2015 Defense Budget addresses the specific requirements of the present and future **logistics capabilities** that will support the Joint Force 2020, by enhancing the resiliency of the operational bases in the Asia-Pacific and improve critical infrastructure.

3.4. Pursue Investments in Military Capabilities

Acquisition funding totals $154 billion, including $63.6 billion for Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E), and 90.4 billion for procurement [12]. RDT&E funding covers mainly research, technology and product or system component development. Procurement generally deals with the purchase of an already developed weapon system, or equipment. The FY 2015 estimates an increasing procurement allocation toward 2019, while the RDT&E is to maintain the current level. The next two figures depict the FY 2015 numbers related to investments and major acquisition programs.

Weapons Category	FY 2014 Enacted	FY 2015 PB Request	Change
Aircraft and Related Systems	42.4	40.0	-2.4
C4I Systems	6.2	6.6	0.4
Ground Systems	7.4	6.3	-1.1
Missile Defense Programs	8.7	8.2	-0.5
Missiles and Munitions	9.5	9.0	-0.5
Mission Support	48.5	44.4	-4.1
Science & Technology (S&T)	12.0	11.5	-0.5
Shipbuilding and Maritime Systems	23.0	22.0	-1.0
Space-Based Systems	6.2	6.2	--
Sub-Total	163.9	154.2	-9.7
Rescissions	-8.7	-0.3	8.4
Total	**155.2**	**153.9**	**-1.3**

$ in billions

Fig. 5 – FY 2015 Defense Budget Investments including procurement and RDT&E) [13]

		FY 2014		FY 2015	
		Qty	$	Qty	$
Aircraft					
MQ-9	Reaper UAS	20	0.5	12	0.6
C–130J	Hercules	17	1.8	14	1.4
F–35	Joint Strike Fighter	29	7.5	34	8.3
V–22	Osprey	23	1.8	19	1.6
AH–64E	Apache Helicopter	46	1.0	25	0.8
CH–47	Chinook Helicopter	38	1.3	32	1.1
UH–60	Black Hawk Helicopter	70	1.3	79	1.4
MH–60R	Multi-Mission Helicopter	19	0.8	29	1.1
MH–60S	Fleet Combat Helicopter	18	0.4	8	0.2
P–8A	Poseidon	16	3.7	8	2.4
E–2D	Advanced Hawkeye	5	1.3	4	1.2
Bombers	Strategic Bombers	--	0.6	--	0.7
F-22	Raptor	--	0.6	--	0.5
KC-46A	Tanker	--	1.6	7	2.4
Missile Defense					
AEGIS	AEGIS BMD System	52	1.5	30	1.4
THAAD	THAAD BMD System	33	0.8	31	0.8
GMD	GBI Midcourse Defense	1	0.9	--	1.0
Missiles and Munitions					
AMRAAM	AMRAAM Missile	227	0.5	200	0.5
SM-6	Standard Missile	81	0.5	110	0.5
Trident II	Trident II Missile Mods	--	1.5	--	1.5
Ships					
CVN 78	FORD Aircraft Carrier	--	1.7	--	2.1
DDG 51	AEGIS Destroyer	1	2.3	2	3.1
LCS	Littoral Combat Ship	4	2.4	3	2.1
SSN 774	VIRGINIA Submarine	2	6.7	2	6.3
OR	SSBN	--	1.1	--	1.3
Space					
AEHF	AEHF Satellite	--	0.6	--	0.6
EELV	EELV Launch Vehicle	5	1.4	3	1.4
GPS	Global Positioning System	2	1.2	1	1.0
SBIRS	SBIRS Satellite	--	0.8	--	0.8

$ in billions; Includes RDT&E and procurement

Fig. 6 – FY 2015 Major Acquisition Programs [13]

A robust ballistic **missile defense** set of capabilities continues to be a priority, $8.5 billion being allocated, including $7.5 billion for Missile Defense Agency. In the line with Strategic defense Guidance, over $7 billion are allocated to **Space Investment Programs** such as Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Global Positioning System (GPS)**,** and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). The **Cyberspace Operations** capabilities, such as the Cyber Mission Forces, are to be fully supported throughout the FY 2015 and beyond. **Science and Technology**, as a mean to invest in and develop new capabilities, will focus in specific areas, such as space, electronic warfare, countering weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, and high-speed kinetic strike.

4. Conclusions

As the RAND strategist Bernard Brodie said over 60 years ago, *"no amount of defense speeding can ensure one's absolute security*" [12]. The FY 2015 Defense Budget seems to be insufficient if compared against the defense programs contained in the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review documents. Mostly, it

appears that the budget will not be capable of funding the required force levels. Moreover, it assumes that a sizable amount of funds will be secured through a number of savings, which is unlikely to occur along the next fiscal cycle.

However, the US Defense Budget does prove one undisputed truth: the Capability-Based approach is here to stay. Capabilities, as the product of a mature analytical process, are at the very core of the defense spending construct and philosophy, no matter the domain, the mission area, the Service, or the priorities. From national level, to the operational battle space level, the capabilities-based approach describes the key attributes of the projected future US force, such as adaptability, network-based, expeditionary, interoperable, tailorable, all of them aimed to provide the right instruments for defense in a world increasingly more volatile, more unpredictable, and more threatening.

In a period of fiscal austerity, the US top decision makers had to make difficult choices in order to reduce force levels, enhance critical capabilities, and modernize the forces.

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[13] US DoD, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (COMPTROLLER)/Chief Financial Officer, *US DoD Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview*, 2014, pages 1-1, 1-4, 2-4, 2-7,6-1,6-2